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In my dissertation, I examine how policies regulating agricultural production and 
clean technology impact the environment. I focus on policies affecting water depletion, 
water pollution, and fuel consumption. I assess their cost-effectiveness by modeling and 
quantifying the behavioral responses of farmers and households. 
My first essay focuses on decreasing groundwater depletion through increasing 
irrigation efficiency in Mexico. I quantify the impacts of different sources of inefficiency 
on groundwater extraction, and I evaluate the effectiveness of alternative policies that 
aim to reduce the over-extraction of groundwater. I find that mechanisms of electricity 
cost-sharing implemented in many wells have a sizable impact on the inefficiency of 
irrigation applications; thus, policies eliminating electricity cost-sharing mechanisms 
have a substantial effect on decreasing groundwater depletion. In contrast, price-based 
policies are less effective, and policies targeting well-sharing do not have significant 
effect on reducing irrigation application and groundwater depletion.  
In my second essay, I assess policies which attempt to reduce water pollution by 
reducing fertilizer application. Input- and output-based economic policies designed to 
reduce water pollution from fertilizer runoff by adjusting management practices are 
theoretically justified and well-understood. Yet, in practice, adjustment in fertilizer 
application or land allocation may be sluggish. I incorporate time cost as a new 





of the policy effectiveness and the speed at which the policies take effect. I find that 
while both input- and output-based policies are able to induce a significant reduction in 
fertilizer application, input-based policies are more cost-effective than their output-based 
counterparts. Further, input- and output-based policies yield adjustment in fertilizer 
application at the same speed, and most of the adjustment takes place in the short-term. 
Due to the rapid adjustment in land allocation between corn and soybeans, the long-term 
effects of the policies can also be rapidly achieved. Though the time cost does not 
constitute a major concern in my research area, the time dimension may be important in 
research areas in which there are different crops that may not be easily substituted 
between. 
In my third essay, I explore household adoption of gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles 
and the impact of hybrid ownership on annual miles traveled in order to understand how 
hybrid ownership impacts fuel savings. I focus on issues of identification in light of 
several behavioral factors that are believed to influence both hybrid adoption and miles 
traveled. I measure two types of rebound effects associated with hybrid adoption. The 
first one is a traditional rebound effect in which a hybrid owner drives more due to the 
lower travel cost from higher fuel efficiency; the second one is a social status driven 
rebound effect in which a hybrid owner drives more to signal his environmental 
friendliness through driving a hybrid. I find a statistically significant traditional rebound 
effect on miles traveled. However, this rebound effect is only 3% of the average annual 
miles traveled and only slightly offsets the fuel savings from the higher fuel efficiency of 
the hybrid. I do not find evidence of a status-driven rebound effect. I estimate that hybrid 
adoption induces substantial fuel savings that amount to about half of the average fuel









Water, fuel, and air are critical in many ways for human and natural systems. Water 
and fuel are important inputs in numerous production and service systems (e.g., 
agriculture, industry, transportation). Water and air are essential elements that sustain life, 
balance ecological systems, and create a pleasant environment.  
Like all natural resources, water and fuel are not unlimited. According to the report 
of Gleick and Ajami (2014), there are 3.3 billion people in the world living in the areas 
with physical water scarcity, approaching physical scarcity, or economic water scarcity. 
The supply of fuel is limited by the total natural reserves of oil and the ability of current 
technology to exploit those reserves. The demand for energy increases with increases in 
the population and with economic development; the increased demand and limited supply 
can lead to sharp increases in prices (e.g., 2000s Energy Crisis). The scarcity of water and 
fuel points to the importance of increasing efficiency in the use of water and fuel.  
As part of the environment, water and air face continuous degradation caused by 
pollution from economic production and human life. Water pollution is a serious problem 
in both developed and developing countries. According to a report from the United 
Nations, “Water quality is becoming a global concern of increasing significance, as risks 
of degradation translate directly into social economic impacts” (UN 2012). The severity 
of air pollution is already widely acknowledged. A recent report from the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) states that air pollution exposure caused the death of around 7 
million people in 2012 (WHO 2014). The severity of these issues points toward the 








1.1 Water and Agriculture 
Water is an essential factor in many production systems. The major use of water is 
agriculture, which makes up 70 percent of total freshwater use (Gleick and Ajami 2014). 
In particular, I focus on the interface between water and agriculture in terms of both 




1.1.1 Efficiency in Water Use 
My first essay focuses on quantitative evaluation of factors influencing irrigation 
efficiency in Mexico. Such evaluation allows me to identify policies which most 
effectively increase irrigation efficiency and alleviate groundwater depletion from over-
extraction of groundwater. As an arid and semi-arid country, Mexico’s groundwater 
resources are being depleted; in some areas, the depletion is severe. The Mexican federal 
government subsidizes the electricity used in pumping groundwater, which creates an 
incentive to extract. Other potential drivers of over-pumping in Mexico are that wells are 
commonly shared by several farmers and moreover, in some shared wells the total cost of 
electricity is distributed among all irrigators. Sharing wells may aggravate externalities 
associated with exploitation of a common access resource and increase pumping beyond 
the efficient level. Sharing electricity costs reduces the marginal cost of water pumping 
since all farmers sharing the bill jointly pay for the cost of additional pumping from one 
farmer. Subsidies and institutions that decrease the marginal cost of groundwater 
consumption may exacerbate the over-exploitation of groundwater and aggravate 
groundwater depletion. Quantification of the main causes of over-extraction of 
groundwater by farmers has important policy implications. 
The objective of my first essay is threefold. First, I estimate water demand, including 
the potential for allocative inefficiency. Allowing for inefficiency in the estimation of 
irrigation water demand results in a more reliable elasticity estimate (Kumbhakar 2001). 
Second, I estimate the inefficiency in agricultural irrigation in Mexico. Finally, I quantify 
the role of different sources of externalities (i.e., cost-sharing rules and the extent to 





1.1.2 Reducing Water Pollution from Agriculture 
My second essay focuses on the assessment of policies that aim to decrease water 
pollution from agriculture. Water pollution can threaten human health and the stability of 
ecosystems. Also, some polluted water may become unsuitable for consumption 
aggravating water scarcity. Hence mitigating water pollution may be a vehicle to address 
water quantity as well as water quality issues. Fertilizer use in agriculture is a significant 
source of nonpoint source pollution to water (Rabotyagov et al. 2010; Yuan et al. 2013; 
Rebolledo et al. 2016). As a country with a highly developed agricultural system the 
United States faces severe water pollution from agriculture. Finding the most cost-
effective policies to alleviate this problem is a concern of policymakers who are 
interested in both the overall effect of the policy and the speed of effectiveness. 
Assessing the cost-effectiveness of policies mitigating agricultural water pollution 
through decreasing fertilizer use in agricultural production is my main objective.  
 Many policies attempt to reduce water pollution by reducing fertilizer application in 
agriculture, which could be realized by decreasing the fertilizer application rate on a 
certain area or switching land allocation from fertilizer-intensive crops to fertilizer-saving 
crops. While the adjustment of the fertilizer application rate in a certain area can be rapid, 
adjustments to land allocation across crops may be restricted by crop rotational effects 
and quasi-fixed capital constraints (Orazem and Miranowski 1994; Arnberg and Hansen 
2012) and require a long time to be fully realized. For policymakers, not only the 
magnitude of policy effectiveness but also the speed at which policies take effect are key 
concerns when they select the most suitable policy.  I quantify both dimensions in the 




1.2 Fuel Consumption from Household Transportation 
The world transportation sector accounts for almost half the world oil consumption, 
and was responsible for 23 percent of world energy-related GHG emissions in 2004. 
Three quarters of the emissions come from road vehicles (Kahn Ribeiro et al. 2007). In 





GHG emissions, being responsible for 28 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions in 2012 
(US EPA 2015).  
Given the pressures faced by the transportation sector, the United States government 
has designed the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to improve the 
average fuel economy of cars and light trucks sold in the United States. In part to meet 
the CAFE criterion the federal government (and some state and local government) has 
provided many incentives to encourage the adoption of fuel-efficient vehicles. The 
gasoline-electric hybrid has been the focus of many policies, as conventional wisdom 
suggests that a driver of a hybrid will consume less gasoline than had he/she driven a 
conventional engine vehicle.  
However, a rebound effect is often associated with the adoption of more efficient 
technology, given the reality that higher efficiency means lower cost of use. In the case of 
hybrid adoption, it means that the higher fuel-efficiency of a hybrid vehicle reduces the 
cost of travel, which consequently may increase the driving miles of a household. It is 
important to understand the extent to which the rebound effects offset the impact from 
higher fuel efficiency, in order to understand the true potential for hybrid adoption to 
reduce gasoline consumption. In another words, it is crucial to examine the existence and 
magnitude of any rebound effects of hybrid adoption. The objective of my third essay is 
to understand whether there are rebound effects associated with the adoption of hybrid 
vehicles, and what the magnitudes of the rebound effects are if they exist. 
My analysis focuses on two types of rebound effects. The first one is a traditional 
rebound effect in which a hybrid owner drives more due to the lower travel cost from 
higher fuel efficiency of the hybrid. The second one, that has yet to be discussed in the 
literature, is a social status driven rebound effect. Sexton and Sexton (2014) and Delgado 
et al. (2015) find that social status incentives are a significant factor underlying consumer 
demand for the Toyota Prius. I hypothesize that this same social status incentive leads 
hybrid owners to increase miles traveled. This hypothesis rests on two facts: first, the 
most popular hybrid over the 2000’s decade was the Prius, easily identified by its unique 
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CHAPTER 2 THE ROLE OF COMMON POOL PROBLEMS IN IRRIGATION 





It is well known that the economically efficient use of finite natural resources 
requires those resources to be priced at the marginal social cost which includes 
externalities associated with extraction. When prices do not reflect the full social cost it is 
expected that resource use exceeds a socially optimal level. One such resource is 
groundwater; groundwater aquifers can be either renewable or non-renewable but are 
always finite. Policies to reduce over-extraction such as a per-unit tax on groundwater 
extraction (Shah et al. 1993; Howe 2002) or creating property rights (Provencher and 
Burt 1994) may be difficult to implement. Consequently it is important to examine 
alternative policy instruments that can successfully tackle the depletion problem.  
Groundwater use accounts for approximately 26 percent of all water use worldwide 
and is a source of almost half of all irrigation water (van der Gun 2012). Price-distorting 
policies such as subsidized electricity rates may lead to excessive extraction and 
exacerbate groundwater depletion (Schoengold and Zilberman 2007). Subsidized 
electricity or diesel rates for irrigators are pervasive in many countries including India, 
Mexico, Jordan, and Syria (Scott and Shah 2004; Shah et al. 2007).  
In addition to subsidized pumping costs it is also common in developing countries 
for multiple irrigators to share a single well (see Huang et al. 2013 for a discussion of this 
issue in China; the current study evaluates Mexico’s shared wells). This situation may 
exacerbate over-extraction due to strategic behavior by farmers (Provencher and Burt 
1993). Moreover, in some communal wells, the cost of energy associated with pumping is 
shared by irrigators using the well due to inadequate metering systems. Rules for cost-





holdings, or may be based on an arbitrary rule such as equal cost-sharing. These rules 
introduce further distortions between what the farmer pays and the actual cost of 
pumping and cause inefficiency in irrigation.                                                                         
The objective of this study is threefold. First, we will estimate water demand, 
including the potential for allocative inefficiency. Allowing for inefficiency in the 
estimation of irrigation water demand results in a more reliable elasticity estimate 
(Kumbhakar 2001). Second, we will gauge the inefficiency (if any exist) with which 
irrigation is applied by farmers in Mexico. Finally we will quantify the role of different 
sources of externalities (i.e., cost-sharing rules and the extent to which groundwater 
resources are non-excludable) behind systematic inefficiency. Quantification of the main 
causes of over-extraction of groundwater by farmers has important policy implications. If 
institutional arrangements creating common pool problems are the main cause, as 
opposed to subsidies in electricity price, institutional reforms will constitute a viable 
mechanism for water conservation. If pumping is sensitive to the cost of electricity, 
removal of subsidies can have a sizable impact on groundwater extraction. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the existing literature. Second, 
we model key features of electricity subsidies, well-sharing, and cost-sharing, and 
identify their distortions to the marginal cost of pumping. Third, we describe the 
empirical model and data used to estimate water demand and farmers’ irrigation 





2.2 Review of Literature 
It has been established theoretically that non-excludability of groundwater resources 
may result in over-application of irrigation. This is because non-excludability causes a 
cost externality (Gisser and Sanchez 1980; Negri 1989) and a strategic externality (Negri 
1989; Provencher and Burt 1993; Rubio and Casino 2001, 2003), both of which tend to 





irrigation application. Subsequent empirical analyses uncovered evidence supporting 
these theoretical predictions (Pfeiffer and Lin 2012; Huang et al. 2013).  
Substantial research has focused on the estimation of irrigation water demand (Ogg 
and Gollehon 1989; Schoengold et al. 2006; Huang et al. 2010; Hendricks and Peterson 
2012) but this research assumes that farmers use water efficiently. The assumption of 
efficiency may constitute a source of bias in estimation of demand elasticity (Kumbhakar 
2001). Moreover this assumption implies attributing over-extraction to random factors 
precluding quantification of systematic sources behind it. 
Despite sound theoretical reasons to suspect inefficiencies in irrigation application, 
very few studies have quantified this inefficiency and explored their reasons. McGuckin, 
et al. (1992) was the first study to estimate the sources of inefficiency in irrigation water 
use among corn producers in Nebraska, United States, based on a stochastic production 
frontier function. Karagiannis et al. (2003) estimate efficiency in irrigation practices for 
out-of-season vegetable cultivation in Greece. Finally, Dhehibi et al. (2007) gauge both 
technical and irrigation water efficiency in Tunisia. Unfortunately, these studies have not 
estimated a demand for irrigation water precluding comparison between price-based 
policies and other types of policies.  
This study uses a stochastic frontier for estimation of irrigation efficiency and its 
sources but in contrast to previous studies we use a method first developed by 
Kumbhakar (1989) that allows measurement of input-specific allocative efficiency based 
on a cost frontier. Using a dual measure of efficiency allows estimation of derived 
demands. This is critical in this context as we are also interested in estimation of price 
elasticity of irrigation water demand so that price-based and institutions-based policies 




2.3 Groundwater Depletion in Mexico: Background 
Mexico is classified as an arid and semi-arid country. Therefore irrigation constitutes 
a critical input to agricultural production in many regions of the country. According to 





land area in Mexico is equipped for irrigated agriculture and about half of the total value 
of agricultural production is produced under irrigation. Moreover, about a third of 




Source: Comisión Nacional del Agua (National Water Commission), Mexico 
 
Figure 2.1: Aquifer Depletion in Mexico 
 
In 2006, preliminary evaluations of the situation in Mexico were conducted with the 
purpose of informing the Mexican government’s national hydrological program. The 
resulting report (Programa Nacional Hidrico 2007-2012) asserted that, among other 
causes, inefficiencies in the use of water had caused overexploitation of groundwater 
reserves (Figure 2.1). It was further noted that electricity subsidies provided by the 
federal government could also be contributing to overexploitation of groundwater. One 
implication of this observation is that elimination of the electricity subsidy could help 
mitigate the depletion problem. But in addition to subsidies, well-sharing and electricity 
cost-sharing may also be partly responsible for inefficiency in water use. Therefore 
policymakers may also tackle over-extraction by reforming the institutions under which 





empirical quantification of distortionary forces behind over-extraction and the resulting 
potential of alternative policies, has not yet been conducted. This study attempts to fill 




2.4 Distortions to Marginal Cost of Pumping 
Mexican farmers do not pay for groundwater, only for the electricity used in 
pumping groundwater. Therefore the cost paid by the farmer per unit of water consumed 
depends on the amount of electricity used per unit of water pumped and the price of 
electricity. The amount of electricity used per unit of extracted groundwater (measured as 
kilowatts hour per cubic meter) is assumed to be a linear function of the depth to water 
table denoted by 𝐻;  i. e. ,
𝑘𝑤ℎ
𝑚3
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻.  Parameter 𝛽  is positive as greater depth is 
associated with greater electricity consumption. Parameter 𝛼 is also positive as the pump 
needs to be run even if distance to groundwater is zero (𝐻 = 0). We assume that total 
water extracted in a given period positively affects depth to the water table 𝐻 = 𝜇 +
∑ 𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑖 ; where parameter 𝜇  captures depth to water table in the previous period plus 
recharge rate, 𝑤𝑖  represents the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  farmer’s pumping rate, and 𝑖  is the effect of the 
farmer 𝑖’s pumping on water level. 
We begin by considering a case where water resources are perfectly excludable 
which serves as a benchmark for this analysis. Thus, since 𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, the unit 
cost of water for farmer 𝑖 is: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑤 = 𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ(𝑎 + 𝑏𝑤𝑖)                                           (2.1) 
where 𝑃𝑖
𝑤 denotes unit cost of water, 𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ is the price of electricity per kilowatt hour, 
𝑘𝑤ℎ
𝑚3
 has been replaced by (𝑎 + 𝑏𝑤𝑖) (after plugging 𝐻 into this expression) with 𝑎 = 𝛼 +
𝛽𝜇, 𝑏 = 𝛽 𝑖 , and the rest is as defined before. The total cost of pumping can be denoted 
by: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑤 = 𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ(𝑎 + 𝑏𝑤𝑖)𝑤𝑖.                              (2.2) 
Based on total cost (2.2), marginal cost (partial derivative of total cost with respect to 






𝑤 = 𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ(𝑎 + 2𝑏𝑤𝑖) .                                                                                      (2.3) 
This expression for marginal cost will be used as a benchmark against which marginal 


















2.4.1 Electricity Subsidies 
The federal government in Mexico subsidizes electricity used in pumping 
groundwater. Guevara-Sanginés (2006) estimates that the total subsidy to Mexican 
groundwater irrigators is approximately $700 million dollars per year.1 An electricity 
subsidy operates as a reduction in the price per kilowatt hour of electricity paid by 
                                                          


































farmers. Therefore, under an electricity subsidy, the marginal cost of pumping 
groundwater is denoted by:  
𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ]                                                                                          (2.4) 
where 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ  represents the subsidy paid by the government per kilowatt hour of 
electricity consumed by the farmer, and the superscript 𝑠 indicates electricity subsidy. 
The reduction in marginal cost of pumping caused by the subsidy on electricity is 




. Figure 1 also depicts a decreasing marginal revenue curve due to decreasing 
marginal productivity of irrigation. The combination of a clockwise rotation of marginal 
cost and a downward sloping marginal revenue curve causes an increase in pumping. The 
overall effect of the electricity subsidy on pumping will be determined by the magnitude 





2.4.2 Sharing of Wells among Farmers 
The description of marginal cost of pumping in the previous section assumed a well 
is operated by a single farmer. However, different wells in Mexico function under 
different institutional arrangements. Some wells are individually owned while others are 
shared by multiple farmers. Table 2.1 describes the percentage of wells that are either 
owned by a single producer or jointly shared by multiple producers. As expected, we 
observe a large number of wells that are shared by multiple irrigators. 
Models formalizing cost and strategic externalities (Provencher and Burt 1993) show 
that sharing of water resources by multiple irrigators may decrease marginal cost and 
aggravate over-extraction. Moreover these analyses have demonstrated that an increased 
number of irrigators sharing the resource is associated with greater pumping. As revealed 
by Table 2.1 the majority of wells (61 percent) are shared by multiple irrigators. Table 
2.1 also shows the distribution of the number of users per well in our sample. The mean 
number of users is about 12. While the median size of the group is 6, about a quarter of 
wells are shared by more than 16 farmers. These figures suggest that inefficiencies or 





Table 2.1: Distribution of Number of Users for Multi-producer Wells 
Number of Users Frequency Percentage 
1 77 39.1% 
2 – 5 21 10.7% 
6 – 10 35 17.8% 
11 - 15 14 7.1% 
16 - 20 13 6.6% 
21 - 30 13 6.6% 
31 - 40 13 6.6% 
41 - 50 4 2.0% 
51 - 75 5 2.5% 
76 - 100 2 1.0% 
Total 197 100% 
 
When multiple farmers share a well, the depth of the water table is influenced by the 
sum of individual pumping rates. Moreover each farmer’s pumping has the same effect 
on the depth to the water table such that  𝐻 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖 ; where 𝑤𝑖  represents the 
𝑖𝑡ℎfarmer’s pumping rate,  is the increase in depth per unit of water pumped, and the rest 
is as before. Thus, the unit cost of water for farmer 𝑖 who shares a well with other farmers 
is: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ](𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑤𝑖 + ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 ))                               (2.5) 
where 𝑃𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠
 denotes unit cost of water under an electricity subsidy and well-sharing, 
with 𝑤𝑠 in the superscript indicating well sharing, and the rest is as defined before.  
Based on (2.5), marginal cost can be expressed as:  
𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ]((𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊) + 𝑏𝑤𝑖(1 + 𝜌))                             (2.6) 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠
 denotes marginal pumping cost of water under an electricity subsidy 
and well-sharing; 𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑤𝑖 + ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 ; 𝜌 is a parameter representing farmer 𝑖’s 
conjecture about others’ reactions to her pumping decisions; 𝜌 = ∑
𝜕𝑤𝑗
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖 . This 
parameter typically captures the degree to which pumping rates by different farmers are 
strategic substitutes 𝜌 < 0 or strategic complements 𝜌 > 0. The parameter 𝜌 is typically 





The effect of both distortions (electricity subsidy and well-sharing) combined is 




. The specific distortionary effect of well-sharing is depicted as the wedge 
between 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠
 and  𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠
. The magnitude of the increase in pumping caused by 
well-sharing depends on the size of this wedge and the slope of the marginal revenue 
curve. 
The magnitude of the rotation in marginal cost caused by well-sharing represents the 
strength of the cost and strategic externalities previously discussed. A key parameter to 
both externalities is the drawdown faced by one farmer when another extracts water. 
When multiple farmers draw from the same well, drawdown caused by one farmer’s 
extraction affects everyone sharing the well equally so the effect of the cost and strategic 
externalities is potentially large. In other words, the magnitude of the clockwise rotation 




2.4.3 Electricity Cost-Sharing 
With multiple producers, it can be difficult to calculate individual water use without 
the appropriate technology. In our sample, about 38 percent of the wells base the cost on 
the number of hours an individual irrigates (this means that farmers do not share the cost 
of electricity but rather pay for their own consumption), while 38 percent divide the cost 
based on land area and another 25 percent split cost in equal shares. The remaining 77 
wells are owned by a single producer. The distribution of cost share rules across our 
sample gives us enough variability to quantify the effect of these cost share rules on 
irrigation efficiency. 
Distributing the cost of electricity based on pre-specified payment rules may 
introduce further distortions in marginal cost of pumping. To model the distortions of 
cost share rules, we consider the case of a farmer that pays a pre-specified share 𝑠𝑖 of the 
total electricity bill. The unit cost of water in this case is: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ] (𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑤𝑖 + ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 ))
𝑊𝑠𝑖
𝑤𝑖







 denotes unit cost of water under cost share with 𝑐𝑠 in the superscript 
indicating cost-sharing, 𝑠𝑖 is the share of total electricity bill paid by the
  𝑖𝑡ℎ farmer and 
the rest is as before. If electricity cost is split based on land area, 𝑠𝑖 =
𝐿𝑖
𝐿
, where 𝐿𝑖 is the 
land endowment of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ farmer and 𝐿 is total land area irrigated with water from the 




where 𝑁 is the total number of farmers drawing water from the same well.  
The marginal cost of pumping can then be denoted by: 
𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ](1 + 𝜌)(𝑎 + 2𝑏𝑊)𝑠𝑖                                          (2.8) 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠
 denotes marginal cost of water under subsidy, well share, and cost 
share and the rest was defined before.   
We are interested in identifying conditions under which electricity cost-sharing may 




, which is found to be satisfied if (1 +
𝜌)𝑠𝑖 < 1 (derivation of this condition and further discussion can be found in Appendix 
A). Given the share of the electricity bill assigned to a given farmer, one farmer’s 
pumping increases other farmers’ cost even in the absence of drawdown (i.e., even in the 
absence of cost and strategic externality). This is due to an increase in others’ unit cost of 
water as revealed by Equation (2.7). Equation (2.7) shows that sharing the cost of 
electricity creates another source of non-excludability resulting from the fact that 
individual farmers cannot exclude others from their own electricity expenditure. We call 
this externality “cost share externality”.  
The effect of the cost share externality with subsidized electricity rates is illustrated 
in Figure 1 by a clockwise rotation of the marginal cost of pumping from 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤  to 
𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠





. The magnitude of the increase in water pumped 
caused by cost-sharing will depend upon the size of this wedge and the slope of the 
marginal revenue curve. In turn, the size of the wedge depends upon the farmer’s share of 
electricity bill and their conjectures about others’ reactions to their pumping decisions 





Formalization and graphical illustration of the effect of multiple distortions prevalent 
in Mexico on the marginal cost of pumping allows us to generate testable hypotheses. We 
now proceed to discuss our hypotheses regarding the drivers of inefficient over-extraction 




2.5 Hypotheses of this Study 
From our discussion of distortions to the marginal cost of pumping, it follows that 
the number of farmers sharing a well and electricity cost-sharing are both expected to 
increase groundwater use. But in line with findings in previous studies in other countries 
and institutional contexts (e.g., Hendricks and Peterson 2012), we expect water demand 
to be inelastic to its unitary price.  
Testing the hypothesis of inelastic water demand requires estimating irrigation 
demand and its own price elasticity. Due to potential inefficiencies associated with 
institutional distortions, the dual frontier (e.g., cost or profit functions) is not a neutral 
transformation of the frontier augmented to incorporate inefficiency and estimates of 
water demand elasticity from the former may be biased (Kumbhakar 2001). Therefore we 
estimate a frontier irrigation demand function and allow for inefficiency in the 
application of irrigation water. We exploit the estimated frontier to measure the effect of 
the number of farmers sharing a well and the electricity cost share rules on irrigation 
efficiency. 
Radial measures of inefficiency (either input-based or output-based) preclude 
decomposition of inefficiency scores with respect to a single production input masking 
differences in efficiency that might be attributed to particular factor inputs (Kopp 1981). 
This is a limitation worth avoiding, especially when there are reasons to suspect that 
certain production factors may be used particularly inefficiently. This may be the case 
with irrigation given the institutional arrangements distorting its marginal cost. Failure to 
identify inefficiency attributable to a specific input factor hinders input-specific policy 
design (Sauer and Frohberg 2007). To gauge efficiency in irrigation application, we use 






Kumbahkar’s model of input-specific efficiency was created for estimation with 
panel data. Sauer and Frohberg (2007) adapt it to cross-sectional data and divide firms 
into different groups to measure the input-specific efficiency of each group. In this paper, 
we follow Sauer and Frohberg (2007) and use cross-sectional data to measure the impact 
of institutional arrangements (i.e., multiple irrigators pumping from the same well and 
electricity cost-sharing) on the efficiency with which irrigation is applied. Other physical, 
hydrological, and socio-demographic variables are also incorporated.  
It has been argued  (Sauer and Frohberg 2007) that the Symmetric Generalized 
McFadden (SGM) form is a desirable cost function specification because it is flexible 
(i.e., it satisfies the second-order flexibility conditions) and at the same time it adheres to 
theoretical conditions of a cost function as shown by Diewert and Wales (1987). In 
addition, the SGM specification allows imposition of global concavity conditions and 
estimation of average input demand functions avoids the “Greene problem”2 (Sauer and 
Frohberg 2007). This set of desirable properties make this functional form an appropriate 
choice for this study. 
The SGM cost function is denoted as: 
𝐶∗(. ) = 𝑔(𝑝)𝑦 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑖  + ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑦
𝑖𝑖









+ 𝑏𝑦𝑦 (∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑖
) 𝑦2 + ∑  
𝑘




𝑦                                  
                       𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝑛,        𝑘, 𝑙 = 1, 2, … 𝑚          (2.9) 




                                       (2.10) 
where 𝑝𝑖 is the price of variable input 𝑖; 𝑝 is the vector of such prices; 𝑦 is output; 𝑞𝑘 and 
𝑞𝑙 represent quantities of fixed inputs; 𝑆 is an 𝑛 × 𝑛  symmetric matrix;  𝜃 = (𝜃1, … , 𝜃𝑛)′ 
                                                          
2 When Greene (1980) estimates technical and allocative inefficiency using translog cost function, he finds 
that the relationship between allocative inefficiency and the total costs of inefficiency is unclear and hard to 
define in the model. As a result, he assumes that the allocative inefficiency and the total costs of 
inefficiency are independent to each other, which, as Greene points out, is not a very reasonable 






is a vector of nonnegative constants with at least one non-zero element; 𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑖𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑘, 𝑎𝑘, 
𝛼𝑖𝑘, 𝑏𝑦𝑦, 𝛽𝑖, 𝛿𝑘𝑙, and 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑘 represent parameters. 
Differentiating (2.9) with respect to input price and applying Shephard’s lemma, the 
conditional demand function of input 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖











∑  𝑖 ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗
(∑ 𝜃𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑟)2










        𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑟 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛        𝑘, 𝑙 = 1, 2, … , 𝑚.                                                           (2.11) 
Concavity holds for 𝑝𝑖 > 0 with 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑦 > 0 and 𝑞𝑘 > 0 with 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑚, if 
and only if, the Hessian matrix 𝑆 = [𝑠𝑖𝑗] is negative semi definite (nsd). Following the 
procedure outlined in Diewert and Wales (1987) concavity restrictions on 𝑆 are imposed 
by re-parameterizing it as 𝑆 = −𝐴𝐴′, where 𝐴 is a lower triangular matrix of order 𝑛, and 
since 𝑝∗ is chosen to be a vector of ones,  ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖. For estimation purpose, 𝑏𝑦𝑦, 
𝑎𝑘 , 𝛿𝑘𝑙  are normalized to unity, and 𝜃𝑖  is replaced by the mean values of 𝑥𝑖  over the 
whole sample. This re-parameterization makes 𝐶(. ) linear homogeneous, monotone and 
concave in 𝑝 as well as symmetric (see also Lau 1978, 1986), making the properties of 
the cost function consistent with economic theory. 
Adding systematic inefficiency components and an error term, the conditional 
demand functions given in (2.11) can be written as follows:  
   𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
∗ + 𝑖1𝑍𝑖1 + 𝑖2𝑍𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝑖𝐻𝑍𝑖𝐻 + 𝑣𝑖                   (2.12) 
where each 𝑍𝑖ℎ  (ℎ = 1, … , 𝐻 ) is a vector of variables (𝑍𝑖ℎ1, … , 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝐺)  and 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑔  ( 𝑔 =
1, … , 𝐺) indicates that the observation belongs to group 𝑔 with respect to characteristic ℎ 
which may influence the efficiency of input 𝑖. For instance, the cost share mechanism is 
one characteristic in our application. Three groups are observed in our sample with 
respect to this characteristic: irrigators that split the electricity cost evenly, those that 
divide the cost based on land area, and those that do not share the cost of electricity. 





𝑖ℎ𝑔 indicates that farmers within group 𝑔 of characteristic ℎ tend to use more of input 𝑖, 
all else constant.  
Inefficiency 𝜏𝑖𝑔ℎ of the group 𝑔 with respect to characteristic ℎ in the use of input 𝑖 
can be calculated through: 
𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔 = 𝑖ℎ𝑔 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛ℎ 𝑖ℎ𝑔.            (2.13) 
An intuitive interpretation of Equation (2.13) suggests that 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔  represents the 
reduction in the quantity of input 𝑖 achievable by switching to the most efficient group 
with characteristic ℎ holding the application of all other inputs unchanged. The input-
specific allocative efficiency of group 𝑔 with respect to characteristic ℎ  in the use of 
input 𝑖 is:  
    𝐴𝐸𝑖ℎ𝑔 = 1 − 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔/𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑔 .              (2.14)    
The percentage cost increase faced by observations belonging to group 𝑔  within 
characteristic ℎ due to inefficiency in input 𝑖 can be calculated by: 
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑖ℎ𝑔 = 𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑔𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔/𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑔           (2.15)     
where 𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑔  is observed total production cost of farmers in group 𝑔  with respect to 
characteristic ℎ. 
The measure 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑖ℎ𝑔 allows identification of the inputs with the greatest potential for 
cost savings because it weighs input quantity reductions by their respective prices. As 
explained by Kumbhakar (1989), one of the advantages of this procedure is that no 
special distributional assumptions are needed on 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔, as independence between 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔 and 





A survey of agricultural groundwater irrigators was conducted in Mexico by the 
Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático (National Institute of Ecology and 
Climate Change). Data collection on irrigation wells occurred during the 2003-2004 





Cross sectional data was obtained from farmers in a sample of 197 wells. Irrigation 
wells are uniformly scattered across the country so they are geographically representative 
of agricultural groundwater irrigators in Mexico. Detailed data on quantity and prices of 
inputs and outputs were obtained from farmers along with data on irrigation application 
and cost of electricity used in pumping groundwater. Data includes quantities and prices 
of three variable inputs (fertilizer, irrigation, and a composite of other inputs including 
expenditures in land rent and preparation, labor, pesticide, and marketing), and one fixed 
input (land). A vector of outputs including field crops, fruits, and vegetables were 
aggregated into one single output applying Jorgenson’s procedure for “exact” aggregation 
(Jorgenson et al. 1987).  
Potential sources of inefficiency (i.e., elements of vector 𝑍𝑖ℎ  in Equation (2.12)) 
considered in this study are: mechanism for sharing electricity costs (no cost-sharing, 
evenly split, or based on area), and the number of farmers in each well (i.e., which can 
presumably capture pressures from strategic pumping). Control variables include socio-
demographic, biophysical, and hydrological variables. Variability in irrigation technology 
is not observed as the overwhelming majority of farmers (96 percent in our sample) use 
gravity irrigation systems.  
Table 2.2 reports the mean and standard deviation of variables by type of cost share. 
Some variables have similar distributions in all four groups. For example, the farmer’s 
age and soil type are similar for all four groups. However, we do find systematic 
differences across groups. Irrigation units that have no cost share (individually-owned 
wells and the wells that everyone pays for his/her own water use) have a substantially 
higher average land area (mean of 34.9 and 30.7 hectares) than farmers operating under 
equal share (7.2 hectares) and share based on land area (8.5 hectares). The education 
level of farmers with no cost share is higher compared to those with a cost share. These 
correlations underscore the importance of controlling for education and land area when 








Table 2.2:  Summary Statistics of Data by Cost share Type 








Equal for All 
Users 




46,743 37,988 95,168 93,685 
(36,163) (45,363) (140,352) (169,933) 
Pumping cost of water 
(pesos/m3) 
1.2 1.0 1.7 1.3 
(3.3) (2.2) (4.2) (2.5) 
 Consumed fertilizer 
quantity (kg) 
6,433 6,327 15,838 17,871 
(12,121) (10,936) (18,277) (25,292) 
Fertilizer price 
(pesos/kg) 
2.4 2.0 3.4 2.5 
(1.2) (0.7) (5.0) (1.9) 
Land area (hectares) 
7.2 8.5 30.7 34.9 
(6.0) (8.4) (38.1) (38.3) 
Number of farmers 
sharing one well 
13.1 17.5 23.9 1.0 
(9.6) (16.2) (19.1) (0.0) 
Soil type (1-5) 
3.6 3.2 2.9 3.2 
(1.1) (1.2) (0.9) (1.0) 
Semi-arid or arid 
climate (climate type 
dummy =1 ) 
0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
Well depth (meters) 
128.9 129.7 147.3 121.7 
(46.4) (44.7) (57.6) (119.8) 
Farmers' age (years) 
52.9 53.7 51.2 54.6 
(9.4) (7.8) (11.3) (11.8) 
Education (1-5) 
1.6 1.8 2.7 3.0 
(0.6) (0.9) (1.6) (1.6) 
Share of fruit and 
vegetable 
0.8 0.4 0.3 0.6 
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) 
Number of 
observations 
30 45 45 77 











Following Provencher and Burt (1993), the number of farmers sharing a well is 
included as an explanatory variable in our estimation. Binary indicators for each 
electricity cost-sharing mechanism (evenly-based and area-based) are also included. The 
effect of these variables on irrigation may be confounded with the effect of other drivers 
such as soil type, climate regime, depth to groundwater, age and education of farmers, 
and crop types. Obtaining reliable estimates of the link between well sharing, cost share 
rules and pumping requires controlling for these factors.  
The system of equations is specified as:  
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
∗ + 𝑎𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑁 + 𝑎𝑐𝑠1𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑆1 + 𝑎𝑐𝑠2𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑆2 + 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐼 + 𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐿  
+𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 + 𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝑎𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝑎𝑦𝑓𝑣𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝐹𝑉 + 𝑣𝑖  
𝑖 = 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠       (2.16) 
where 𝑥𝑖
∗ is defined by Equation (2.11) which captures the impact of prices of inputs, 
outputs, and fixed inputs, 𝑁 is the number of farmers sharing a well, and 𝐶𝑆1 and 𝐶𝑆2 are 
the cost share dummies.  
Equation system (2.16) also includes controls for soil type (𝑆𝐼 = 1, … ,5, where 𝑆𝐼 =
1 for finest soil and 𝑆𝐼 = 5 for coarsest), depth of well (𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) measured in meters to 
water table, age of the farmer (AGE), education of the farmer (EDUCATION) (i.e., (1) 
did not finish elementary school, (2) finished elementary school, (3) finished middle-
school, (4) finished high-school, (5) more than high-school),3 climate zone (CL), and 
crop types (YFV) which is captured by the share of fruit and vegetable in total output as 
these crops tend to be more water intensive than field crops.  
The climate zones are based on the widely used Köppen-Geiger classification system, 
which are used internationally for consistency between nations and regions. Mellinger, 
Sachs and Gallup (1999) provide an excellent description of the classification system. 
Since the climate zones are not ordered based on expected precipitation or irrigation 
                                                          
3  Education may be more appropriately captured by a dummy variable for each level of schooling. 
However, this would create 4 more variables in each equation which would result in a significant increase 
in the number of parameters to be estimated. Measuring education by a categorical variable increases the 





requirements, we create two categorical variables for the empirical analysis.4 The default 
(omitted) category refers to regions with a temperate climate and a dry winter, while the 
alternative category refers to regions with a semi-arid or arid climate. We expect that 
irrigation requirements will be lower in the default category than the alternative category.     
With shared wells we do not have sufficient information to attribute input usage and 
output production to specific farmers so we use the average age and education of 
surveyed farmers as the socio-demographic variables for the unit. Output includes field 
crops, fruits, and vegetables. Fruits and vegetables are typically more water intensive 
than field crops so we include the combined share of fruits and vegetables in total output. 
The system (2.16) is estimated using a nonlinear iterative seemingly unrelated 
regression estimator with Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors.5 With three inputs, the matrix 𝑆𝑖𝑗  is a 3 by 3 matrix, which is recovered from 





Demand equations for water, fertilizer and the composite of other inputs are 
estimated simultaneously and their R-squared values are 0.74, 0.59, and 0.86 respectively. 
The coefficients for correlation of error terms across equations are -0.13, 0.10 and -0.02 
for water and fertilizer equations, water and the composite input, and fertilizer and the 
composite input equations respectively.6 Table 2.3 reports estimation results of the water 
equation. Results for the other two inputs are reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. The 
number of farmers sharing a well does not have a statistically significant impact on   
                                                          
4  The limited number of degrees of freedom makes it impossible to estimate coefficients for seven 
categorical variables based on each unique climate zone. 
5 To impose concavity on the cost function, we have to estimate Aij instead of Sij. While Sij are linear in our 
model, Aij are not. As a result, a nonlinear SUR regression is used instead of linear regression. 
6 The null hypothesis of no correlation across error terms in the system is strongly rejected at the 1% level 





Table 2.3: Coefficient Estimates for Water Demand 
 Water equation Estimates            
Constant -39896.6  
 (33315.0) 
Output quantity 547.6**  
 (247.6) 
Interaction of land area and output quantity -97.5***  
 (35.4) 
Land area 3208.5***  
 (394.9) 
Quadratic term of output quantity 2.1**  
 (0.9) 
Interaction of quadratic land area and output quantity 1.0**  
 (0.5) 
Dividing electricity bill by share of land area 16456.9**  
 (8114.8) 
Dividing electricity bill evenly 25801.5***  
 (8515.8) 
Number of farmers sharing a well 279.0  
 (316.5) 
Soil type 6566.6  
 (5629.1) 
Climate type 12315.7  
 (14850.1) 
Depth of well 42.8  
 (54.8) 
Age -227.6  
 (419.2) 
Education 4078.8  
 (4436.3) 









Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**) and three asterisk (***) denote 







irrigation application. This result suggests that strategic pumping caused by well-sharing 
is weak, at best.7  
Sharing the cost of electricity evenly has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on irrigation application. Sharing the cost of electricity based on land area also 
has a positive but smaller impact. Results of cost share variables are consistent with the 
hypothesis that cost-sharing reduces irrigation use efficiency.  
To ensure that the effect of cost-sharing is not being confounded with the effect of 
well-sharing, we have also estimated the model with the sub-sample of shared wells only. 
The effect of electricity cost-sharing is robust to this change, though the reduction in 
sample size reduces the precision of the coefficients.   
 





Farmers paying their own actual electricity consumption 1.00 0% 
Farmers dividing electricity bill based on their land share 0.73 5% 
Farmers dividing electricity bill evenly 0.58 7% 
 
Parameter estimates are used to calculate efficiency as described by Equations (2.13) 
and (2.14) and results are reported in Table 2.4. Implementing an evenly split cost share 
mechanism decreases farmers’ irrigation efficiency to 0.58 while implementing a land-
based cost share mechanism decreases farmers’ irrigation efficiency to 0.73. These 
results show that a cost share rule which splits the electricity cost evenly among farmers 
has a stronger effect than a rule establishing cost share based on land area.  
Our results show that the cost distortion introduced by electricity cost-sharing is 
substantial. Cost-sharing creates a situation where a farmer pays only a fraction of the 
electricity cost of his/her extra pumping. Under an evenly split cost share rule this is 
                                                          
7 The model was also estimated with a quadratic term for 𝑁 and interaction terms between 𝐶𝑆1, 𝐶𝑆2 and 𝑁 
to consider different channels through which well sharing might affect irrigation. We have also estimated a 






perhaps a small fraction of total electricity cost (e.g., only 20% in a well shared by 5 
farmers). Under a land-share rule, larger farmers may not benefit as much as their smaller 
counterparts. Consequently the effect of an evenly-split cost share rule is found to be 
larger in magnitude and statistically more robust, than a cost share rule based on land area. 
Our results suggest that distortions caused by the cost and strategic externalities (i.e., 
the magnitude of the clockwise rotation from 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠  to 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠  in Figure 1) are not 
strong. This may be explained by a small impact of individual pumping on the water level, 
absence of strategic pumping from farmers sharing the well, or by unobservable self-
governance institutions facilitating cooperative behavior. But, if such institutions were 
effective enough to eliminate the marginal cost-reducing effects of well-sharing, they 
would also eliminate the effect of electricity cost-sharing mechanisms (rotation from 
𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 to 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 in Figure 1), which does not seem to be the case. Therefore, 
while the influence of hydrological and institutional features cannot be distinguished in 
our analysis, results suggest that the insignificant effect of well sharing on pumping is 
explained by a small impact of an individual's pumping on water level or absence of 
strategic pumping, rather than the existence of cooperative institutions. 
Allocative inefficiency in irrigation application results in production cost that is 
higher than the minimum cost. The increase in cost for farmers operating under each cost 
share mechanism can be calculated based on Equation (2.15). The percentage increase in 
cost due to allocative inefficiency with cost-sharing is reported in Table 2.4. We find that 
allocative inefficiency associated with area-based (evenly-based) cost share increases 
total production cost by 5 (7) percent. Therefore in addition to having a significant impact 
on the overall amount of water pumped, irrigation inefficiency also has a sizable effect on 
overall production costs. This suggests that removal of inefficiency sources will not only 
alleviate groundwater depletion but also improve farmers’ welfare. 
The own price elasticity of demand for irrigation water is reported in Table 2.3 and it 
is -0.06 (with a bootstrapped standard deviation of 0.02 so the elasticity estimate is 
significant at 5% level), which means that a doubling of the unitary cost of pumping 
would reduce irrigation by 6 percent.  Thus, only a very substantial increase in pumping 





Some limitations of this analysis are worth noting. The cross sectional nature of our 
data does not allow us to control for unobservable fixed effects that may be correlated 
with our explanatory variables. We are able to control for some important time-invariant 
factors such as soil, climate, and socio-demographic variables, but analysis with cross-
sectional data always risks omitted variable bias due to correlation between 
unobservables and explanatory variables.  
This analysis, like the rest of the literature, neglects issues of optimal timing of 
irrigation. Inefficiencies can emerge not only in terms of the total amount of water 
applied during the growing season but also in terms of the timing of application. Farmers 
that share the same well may play a dynamic game in which they deviate from the 
optimal irrigation schedule if they believe they avoid the drawdown caused by another 
farmer at the otherwise optimal irrigation time. Finally, a profit maximizing framework 
may be more appropriate for farmers in this context. However, theoretically consistent 
and econometrically implementable input specific efficiency measures in the context of a 
profit dual function are not yet available. Expanding input specific efficiency 




2.10 Policy Implications 
In combination our results show that common pool problems created by the sharing 
of electricity cost can have a sizable impact on pumping. As summarized by Ostrom in 
several studies (e.g., Ostrom 1996), conventional solutions to the common pool problem 
typically include creation of property rights (granting the property of the well to one 
individual or institution) and government ownership and control. The former can have 
significant implementation problems and resistance in the field. For the latter to 
effectively reduce over-extraction regulators would have to: 1) pursue maximization of 
social welfare as their objective; 2) have knowledge of the workings of ecological and 
hydrological systems; and 3) have knowledge of institutional changes that would induce 





An alternative solution that has spontaneously emerged in the field and later 
formalized by Ostrom et al. (1999) is that of self-governance. Our results seem to indicate 
that self-governance institutions inducing cooperative behavior may not have been in 
place in Mexico during the time of the survey or that they were not sufficient to prevent 
considerable inefficiency from the common pool problem created by electricity cost-
sharing rules. Self-governance cannot be successfully implemented everywhere. 
Conditions like feasible improvement of the resource, trust among users, and users’ 
discount rate influence the chances of successful self-governance of a natural resource. 
Therefore the success of these institutional reforms will be determined by the 
idiosyncrasies of wells and regions in Mexico. An ex-ante evaluation of alternative 
institutional arrangements to solve the common pool problem of groundwater in Mexico 
constitutes an undoubtedly important research avenue in the future. 
A much simpler, yet promising solution to the cost share problem is facilitating 
implementation of metering systems and allocation rules that allow charging each farmer 
for his own consumption. This is especially true for those wells that divide electricity 
costs evenly among farmers. In some cases, there may be financial barriers to adoption of 
these technologies and, in others, social ones. Public policies should be aimed at 
removing the barriers preventing adoption of more modern metering systems.  
The magnitude of the own price elasticity of demand suggests that elimination of the 
electricity subsidy by itself is not an effective policy for a significant reduction of 
groundwater pumping. This result, along with the impact of cost share variables on 
irrigation demand, suggest that elimination of cost share mechanisms seems a much more 
promising conservation policy than price-based instruments. In addition, intuition 
suggests that the latter will have a negative effect on farmers’ welfare while the former, 













The objective of this study was to quantify the role of different sources of non-
excludability on irrigation water demand in Mexico. We model three potential distortions 
of the marginal pumping cost of groundwater, and empirically gauge their impacts on 
irrigation demand. Based on insights from the theoretical model of marginal cost of 
pumping, we hypothesize that electricity subsidies, well sharing and electricity cost-
sharing will increase groundwater pumping and aggravate groundwater depletion.  
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that electricity cost-sharing decreases 
farmers’ irrigation efficiency. In fact, results suggest that cost-sharing is at the heart of 
water over-extraction observed in many areas in Mexico. Both cost share rules have a 
statistically and quantitatively significant effect on pumping. Moreover, our results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that water demand is inelastic and, thus, eliminating the 
electricity subsidy is unlikely to result in a substantial reduction in irrigation. We estimate 
that the price elasticity of irrigation is only -0.06, which means that a doubling of the 
unitary cost of pumping would only reduce irrigation by 6 percent. In contrast, the 
hypothesis that well sharing will decrease irrigation efficiency is rejected. Our results 
indicate that the number of farmers sharing a well does not have a statistically significant 
effect on individual pumping, which suggests either a limited effect of individual 
pumping on water level or absence of strategic pumping by farmers sharing the wells. 
Concerning the effect of these policies on farmers’ welfare, one needs to consider 
that policy instruments reducing inefficiency need not cause a reduction in farmers’ 
surplus. This is because increases in individual marginal cost due to institutional reforms 
may be offset by 1) reductions in pumping cost associated with a decrease in the total 
volume pumped, and 2) an increase in water’s marginal value product due to enhanced 
production efficiency. In other words the alleviation of externalities increases overall 
welfare and this tends to offset the raise in individual pumping costs introduced by policy. 
We suggest that policymakers consider all of these effects when making decisions about 
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CHAPTER 3 DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES TO 





It is widely acknowledged that fertilizer (e.g., nitrogen and phosphorus) use in 
agricultural production and the associated runoff leads to high levels of water pollution in 
the surrounding watershed area, as well as downstream (Goolsby et al. 2001; Rabotyagov 
et al. 2010; Yuan et al. 2013; Rebolledo et al. 2016). The application rate of fertilizer on a 
certain area of land is one of the key factors influencing water pollution: all else equal, a 
higher fertilizer application rate leads to a larger amount of nutrient migrating from the 
soil into the water system (Angle et al. 1993; Jaynes et al. 2001). When fertilizer is 
overused the surplus of nutrition in the soil is more likely to cause water pollution (Angle 
et al. 1993; Andraski et al. 2000). Past research finds that farmers often overuse fertilizer 
to avoid potential loss in yield associated with uncertainty in weather and soil nutrition 
levels (Sheriff 2005; Stuart et al. 2014). As a result, a major policy focus is on 
minimizing the impact of fertilizer application on environmental systems. We contribute 
to this policy discussion by shedding light on the dynamics and relative cost-effectiveness 
of input- and output-based policies that use financial incentives to influence farmer 
behavior.  
Input- and output-based policies refer to policies that target the prices of inputs or 
outputs in production; for example, a policy that affects the prices of fertilizer used in 
production is an input-based policy and a policy that affects the price of crops grown on a 
parcel of land is an output-based policy. This definition is different from another 
definition in which an input refers to a variable in the polluter’s choice set of variables 





these choice variables, instead of directly targeting emissions or their proxies (see Shortle 
and Horan 2013 for further discussion). 
Different crops have different requirements for fertilizer application. Corn is a 
particularly fertilizer-intensive crop. According to data published by the Economic 
Research Service at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA ERS), the 
average application rate of nitrogen for corn production in the United States in 2002 was 
154 kg/hectare. The average rate of phosphate application was 67 kg/hectare. Conversely, 
soybeans is a fertilizer-saving crop with an average application rate of nitrogen and 
phosphate being only 24 and 55 kg/hectare. Not surprisingly the production of corn 
usually leads to higher levels of water pollution than soybeans. Research finds that 
continuous corn cultivation causes a higher level of nitrogen runoff than a corn-soybean 
rotation (Weed and Kanwar 1996; Kanwar et al. 1997) because of its repeated high rate 
of fertilizer application year after year (Andraski et al. 2000). For these reasons, crop 
choice is another important factor influencing water pollution, and consequently, another 
channel through which policy can exact reductions. 
Though a variety of policy options are available for targeting improvements in water 
quality via a reduction in fertilizer runoff, economists have long favored financial 
incentives. Financial incentives induce a change in farmer behavior in a manner 
consistent with environmental conservation without dictating the means of conservation. 
This allows each farmer to select his/her best option for reducing runoff, which renders 
financial incentives more efficient than command-and-control policies (Hahn 2000; 
Whittaker et al. 2003). In the context of fertilizer application, financial incentives may 
increase the cost of fertilizer (input-based policies) or reduce the profitability of a 
fertilizer intensive crop, such as corn (output-based policies).   
Input-based policies may operate as a tax on fertilizer use or a subsidy on fertilizer 
reduction, and have been implemented internationally. In the United States, Wisconsin, 
Iowa and Nebraska have levied taxes on fertilizer application (Larson et al. 1996; US 
EPA 2001). In Europe, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway and Sweden have also 
implemented a fertilizer tax to reduce fertilizer application (Rougoor et al. 2001; 





Output-based policies encourage farmers to substitute to less fertilizer-intensive 
crops by either taxing fertilizer-intensive crops or subsidizing fertilizer-saving crops. 
Florida has levied a tax on fertilizer-intensive crop acreage to reduce phosphorus loadings 
from cropland (Ribaudo 2001). Another policy that has been suggested is to couple an 
environmental standard with federal commodity program payments to reduce fertilizer 
use (USDA ERS 2007, 2011). Such a policy might affect the profitability of different 
crops, and lead to the reduction in fertilizer use. In the Corn Belt, corn and soybeans are 
the main crops that receive government payments. For example, in Iowa, corn and 
soybeans account for 69 and 30 percent respectively in the total base acres of covered 
commodities by the payment programs (Plastina et al. 2016). Given the differences in the 
production practices of corn and soybeans, imposing an environmental standard as a 
condition for commodity program payments would increase the compliance costs of corn 
production relative to soybean production, which in turn would decrease the relative 
profitability of corn.  
Several studies evaluate the relative efficiency of both input- and output-based 
policies. The findings from these studies are mixed. In terms of a reduction in net farm 
income, Huang and Lantin (1993) find that the cost per pound of reducing excess 
nitrogen fertilizer application is lower for input-based policies relative to output-based 
policies. Wu and Tanaka (2005) find that a fertilizer-use tax is more cost-effective than 
incentive payments. Using a general equilibrium model of the United States economy, 
Taheripour et al. (2008) find that output-based policies are more efficient for achieving 
goals with lower nitrogen reduction, but input-based policies become more efficient when 
higher levels of nitrogen reduction are targeted. In contrast, Bourgeois et al. (2014) find 
that mixed policies that combine both input- and output-based policies are more cost-
effective than any single policy.  
The literature that evaluates the relative merits of economic policies targeting water 
quality and fertilizer runoff typically do so on the grounds of relative cost-effectiveness 
(Hahn 2000; Shortle and Horan 2001, 2013). Comparing policies from a Pareto-
efficiency point of view that considers all social costs and benefits of the policy is often 





The cost-effectiveness criterion does not attempt to identify policies capable of attaining 
the optimal level of pollution that maximizes social welfare as does the Pareto-efficiency 
criterion. Instead, it identifies the policy instrument that attains an exogenously given 
environmental target (optimal or not) at minimum cost. The cost-effectiveness criterion 
has been applied to evaluate command-and-control policies as well as financial incentives. 
The former include policies encouraging best management practices or land retirement 
(Khanna et al. 2003; Wu and Tanaka 2005; Rabotyagov et al. 2010). The latter include 
tax/subsidy policies based on agricultural input usage or ambient pollution concentration 
levels (Kampas and White 2002; Wu and Tanaka 2005; Bourgeois et al. 2014). Following 
this literature, we use the cost-effectiveness criterion. 
One limitation in the scope of existing research that we address in this paper is that 
previous research focuses on the overall long-term effectiveness of the policy – i.e., how 
much water pollution reduction is achieved once the effect of the policy is fully realized. 
Past research provides valuable insight; yet, an important, practical aspect of this policy 
discussion is the speed at which each type of policy takes effect, or how long each policy 
takes to achieve these (previously estimated) goals. Understanding the dynamics of full 
adjustment is a crucial factor in assessing the relative cost-effectiveness of input- and 
output-based policies. If a particular type of policy is known to be more effective, yet 
takes a substantially longer time to yield these effects, then that policy may in fact be less 
desirable from an environmental vantage.  
Decreasing the application rate of fertilizer on a certain area of land or switching 
land allocation from a fertilizer-intensive crop to a fertilizer-saving crop are both able to 
reduce fertilizer use. While the adjustment of the application rate of fertilizer can be rapid, 
the adjustment of land allocation across different crops may be sluggish and require a 
long time to be fully realized. Because of crop rotational effects and quasi-fixed capital 
constraints (Orazem and Miranowski 1994; Arnberg and Hansen 2012), farmers respond 
slowly to policies targeting adjustments in land allocation. Vasavada and Chambers 
(1986) find that it takes two years for total agricultural land to adjust to its optimal level 
when land is treated as one single input. When land is divided across different crops, 





allocation between root crops and other crops. This sluggishness in the adjustment of land 
allocation affects the speed at which economic policies affect fertilizer application.  
To simultaneously assess both the magnitude of input- and output-based policy 
effects and the speed at which the policies take effect, we deploy an empirical dynamic 
adjustment model of corn production that takes fertilizer as one of several inputs into 
production. We estimate the dynamic response of fertilizer use to changes in the price of 
both fertilizer (input-based policy) and corn (output-based policy). By estimating the 
response of fertilizer use to changes in the prices of fertilizer and corn, we are able to 
measure the effect of each type of policy on fertilizer use. By estimating the adjustment 
rate of the quasi-fixed inputs (capital and land allocated to corn), we can measure the 
total time required for the policy to take full effect.  
We use county-level data because it is more policy-relevant than farmer level data, 
as policymakers are interested in affecting change over a relatively large area. This focus 
is advantageous when we consider the possibility that, while individual farmers may 
respond to policy-induced incentives slowly, the aggregate response in a county may be 
less sluggish if the total adjustment can be achieved through adjustments made by the 




3.2 Theoretical Foundation and Empirical Specification 
 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical Foundation 
We start by following previous literature (e.g., Hennessy 2006; Du and Hennessy 
2012) and assume that farmers make production decisions (including the amount of 
fertilizer applied) to maximize profits. To the extent that fertilizer application may also 
affect skewness and kurtosis of the yield distribution (Du et al. 2012), farmers’ degree of 
risk aversion and perception of fertilizer impacts may also influence their use. 
Unfortunately, no information is available that allows construction of a reliable measure 
of risk aversion. Nor is there information available to quantify farmers’ perception of the 





there may be other motivations shaping the decision on fertilizer application, we move 
forward with our conventional assumption of profit maximization.  
Our model is a version of the dynamic duality model that has been widely used to 
study the adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs in an agricultural context (e.g., Vasavada and 
Chambers 1986; Luh and Stefanou 1991; Lansink and Stefanou 1997, 2001). The 
foundation of the model is the maximization of the discounted flow of profit for a 
producer of multiple outputs using variable inputs and quasi-fixed inputs (Epstein 1981; 
Epstein and Denny 1983; Lansink and Stefanou 1997):  
𝐽(𝑣, 𝑤, 𝐾, 𝑍, 𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐼




In Equation (3.1), 𝐽(⋅) is the value function; 𝐾 is a vector of quasi-fixed inputs; 𝜋 is 
defined as 𝑣𝑄 ; 𝑄  is a vector of netput (output and variable input) quantities that is 
positive for outputs and negative for inputs; 𝑣  and 𝑤  are vectors of market prices of 
netputs and quasi-fixed inputs, respectively; 𝑍 is a vector of fixed inputs; 𝑟 is the discount 
rate; 𝑠 and 𝑡 reflect technological progress as a time trend; 𝐼 is the corresponding quasi-
fixed input adjustment; and 𝐶(𝐼) is the adjustment cost function.  
The Hamilton-Jacobi equation of the optimization problem in Equation (3.1) is 
𝑟𝐽(𝑣, 𝑤, 𝐾, 𝑍, 𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐼
{𝜋(𝑣, 𝐾, 𝑍, 𝑡) − 𝑤′𝐾 − 𝐶(𝐼) + (𝐼 − 𝛿𝐾)′𝐽𝑘} + 𝐽𝑡, (3.2) 
where δ is the depreciation rate of quasi-fixed inputs, and the subscript notation defines a 
partial derivative (e.g., 𝐽𝑡 =  𝜕𝐽(⋅)/𝜕𝑡). Differentiating (3.2) with respect to 𝑣, results in 
the following netput equations: 
𝑄 = 𝑟𝐽𝑣 − 𝐽𝑘𝑣?̇? − 𝐽𝑡𝑣, (3.3) 
where ?̇? (?̇? = 𝐼 − 𝛿𝐾) is the adjustment of 𝐾. Differentiating (3.2) with respect to 𝑤, 
results in the following adjustment equations: 
?̇? = 𝐽𝑘𝑤
−1(𝑟𝐽𝑤 + 𝐾 − 𝐽𝑡𝑤). (3.4) 
A common assumption is that producers make optimal decisions based on 
information in the current period and their expectations of prices, which are assumed to 
be static (Epstein 1981; Epstein and Denny 1983; Lansink and Stefanou, 1997). This 
assumption excludes uncertainty in future prices faced by farmers. Alternative 





series of price data to generate expected prices. Given other data requirements (see 
Section 3.3), the temporal dimension of our data is restricted to the years 2001 to 2008, 




3.2.2 Empirical Specification 
We use a normalized quadratic specification to parameterize the optimal value 
function. To operationalize the normalized quadratic setup, we use soybeans as the 
numeraire which allows us to focus on the production of corn. Even though the results in 
the normalized quadratic design are not invariant to the choice of the numeraire, it is 
widely used because it is flexible, yet empirically straightforward to implement (Lansink 
and Stefanou 2001). These are important properties in our case, as limited degrees of 
freedom render estimation of a complex model and imposition of constraints difficult.   
Specifically, the normalized quadratic value function is given by 


































In Equation (3.5), 𝑣, the vector of netput prices includes the price of corn, fertilizer, 
and labor; 𝑤, the vector of quasi-fixed input prices, includes the rental price of corn land 
and the shadow price of capital; z, the fixed input, is total cropland; the vector of quasi-
fixed inputs, K, includes corn land and capital; and t is a time trend. All prices are relative 
to the price of soybeans, and all other notation defines matrices of parameters to be 
estimated.  
Following Equation (3.3), the netput equation (in our empirical model, the supply of 
corn, and the demand for fertilizer and labor) is 
𝑄∗ = 𝑟(𝑎1 + 𝐴





and following Equation (3.4), the adjustment equation for quasi-fixed inputs (corn land 
and capital) is 
?̇? = (𝑟 + 𝑀)𝐾 + 𝑟𝑀(𝑎2 + 𝐵
′𝑤 + 𝐶′𝑣 + 𝑆𝑧 + 𝑈𝑡) − 𝑀𝑈. (3.7) 
Equation (3.7) defines a linear relationship between multiple factors and quasi-fixed 
input adjustment, and is sometimes referred to as a multivariate linear accelerator 
𝐾∗̇ = (𝑟 + 𝑀)(𝐾 − 𝐾∗) (3.8) 
where 𝐾∗ is the optimal level of quasi-fixed input 𝐾 written as 
𝐾∗ = 𝑟𝑁(𝑎2 + 𝐵
′𝑤 + 𝐶′𝑣 + 𝑆𝑧 + 𝑈𝑡) − 𝑁𝑈, (3.9) 
𝑁 = −(𝑟 + 𝑀)−1𝑀. (3.10) 
In Equation (3.8), (𝑟 + 𝑀) is the adjustment rate matrix of quasi-fixed inputs 𝐾 to 
their optimal level 𝐾∗. This multivariate accelerator allows the adjustment of one quasi-
fixed input to influence the adjustment of the other quasi-fixed input. In our empirical 
model, we allow adjustments in corn land and capital to affect each other; we then test for 




3.2.3 Measuring Short-Term and Long-Term Effects 
This model allows us to measure both the short-term and long-term response of input 
use to a change in price; hence, we can assess the short-term and long-term effect of a 
policy that influences the price of corn or fertilizer on fertilizer application. The 
difference between the short-term and long-term effects comes from sluggish adjustments 
in the quasi-fixed inputs. In the short-term, the quasi-fixed inputs are assumed to be fixed 
at their current level, while in the long-term they are assumed to adjust to their new 
optimal levels given a new set of equilibrium conditions created by the policy. To make 
these assessments, we use our model to compute short-term and long-term elasticities – 
short-term elasticities keep the quasi-fixed inputs constant, and long-term elasticities 
allow for complete adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs to their long-term optimal level.  
Following standard definitions of short-term and long-term elasticities (Morrison and 
Berndt 1981; Luh and Stefanou 1993; Richards 1999), the short-term price elasticity of 













where 𝑖 and 𝑗 index the netputs and netput prices. Hence, the short-term elasticity given 
in Equation (3.11) allows us to assess the sensitivity of the quantities of corn, fertilizer 
and labor to prices, including both own and cross-price effects. 









which allows us to understand how the netput quantities respond to changes in the price 
of corn land and capital. 
Since, in the short term, quasi-fixed inputs are held constant and do not adjust, 
changes in the price of corn or fertilizer only affect fertilizer application under the current 
land allocation and capital level. That is, these short-term elasticities do not account for 
indirect effects of price changes through adjustments in capital or land allocation.  












































Notice that Equations (3.13) and (3.14) have additional terms that do not appear in 
Equations (3.11) and (3.12). These terms – the summations over 𝑚 – refer to the indirect 
effects that the changes in input and quasi-fixed input price have on the netput quantities 
via adjustment in the quasi-fixed inputs. That is, the long-term elasticity is calculated by 
adding to the short-term elasticities (the first terms in Equations (3.13) and (3.14)) the 
effects associated with adjustment in the quasi-fixed factors. This is an important part of 
the total effect since a change in the price of corn or fertilizer induced via policy not only 
causes a change in fertilizer application directly, but also causes a change in both land 





The long-term price elasticity of quasi-fixed inputs with respect to netput price, 
captured in the second term of Equation (3.13), is  
𝐾𝑚𝑉𝑗








and the long term price elasticity of quasi-fixed inputs to a change in quasi-fixed input 
prices is  
𝐾𝑚𝑊𝑗








These elasticities allow us to measure how a change in the prices of corn land and 




3.3 Description of the Data 
Our analysis focuses on the Wabash River Watershed, which covers 65 counties in 
Indiana, 23 counties in Illinois, and a small part of Ohio. In this watershed, corn and 
soybeans are the main crops produced. In 2014, the planting area of corn and soybeans in 
Indiana constitutes 47.5 and 44.3 percent of the total planting area of field crops; in 
Illinois, these percentages are 51.7 and 42.6 percent for corn and soybeans, respectively 
(USDA NASS). We focus on the county level of aggregation to understand how 
incentives to change agricultural management practices influence water quality over a 
larger geographic area. Because certain data are missing for some counties, our analysis 
covers 44 counties in Indiana and 16 counties in Illinois, for a total of 60 counties. Figure 
3.1 provides a map of the Wabash River Watershed and the counties included in our 
analysis. The counties in our analysis are distributed somewhat uniformly across space; 
hence, we maintain representative coverage over the watershed area despite missing data.  
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel that spans the years 2001 to 2008, providing a 
total of 384 county-year observations. We exclude the 2009 to 2012 years because a 
preliminary analysis indicated that the data spanning these years is too heavily impacted 
by the Great Recession. The empirical model requires quantity and price data for all 





We focus on two outputs, corn and soybeans since the production of corn and soybeans 
constitutes more than 90 percent of all crop production in the Wabash River Watershed 
area; further, corn and soybeans are typical fertilizer-intensive and fertilizer-saving crops, 
respectively. We include two variable inputs, fertilizer and labor; two quasi-fixed inputs, 
capital and land allocated to corn; and one fixed input, total cropland. Since we only 
focus on corn and soybean production, total cropland is the sum of land allocated to corn 
and land allocated to soybeans.  
 
Figure 3.1: The Wabash River Watershed 
The bold (black) line in this figure shows the geographical position of the Wabash River Watershed as it 
spans most of Indiana and part of Illinois. The counties included in our analysis are indicated and shaded in 
blue. 
 
Data on the production quantity of corn and soybeans, the land area allocated to corn 
and soybeans, the price of land, the price and quantity of capital, and the price of 
fertilizer are obtained from the United States Department of Agricultural National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA NASS). Both the quantity and price of labor come 
from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. We use county level data on the 





data are census data, and only have one observation every five years. We use a cubic 
polynomial interpolation to construct annual land price data; we explored, county by 
county, several different interpolation techniques (both linear and nonlinear), and we 
found that the cubic polynomial provided the best fit to most of the counties in our 
analysis. To further increase the reliability of the interpolation, we use 5-year census data 
from 1982 to 2012, so that the interpolation is based on a longer time span. Further, we 
calculate the rental price of land as 4 percent of its value, which is consistent with the 
proportion of cash rent of farmland in its value in Indiana reported by Dobbins and Cook 
(2001-2008) at the time span of our data. 
Machinery and equipment data are used to measure capital. The price of capital is a 
price index of machinery and equipment. To measure the machinery cost paid by farmers 
each year, we construct the shadow price of machinery via 𝑆𝑃 =  𝑂𝑃(𝑟 + δ) (Morrison 
and Berndt 1981), where 𝑆𝑃 indicates the shadow price, which is equal to the original 
price,  𝑂𝑃 , multiplied by the sum of the discount and depreciation rates, 𝑟  and 𝛿 , 
respectively. We assume (𝑟 + δ) is 0.15. The quantity of machinery is recovered by 
dividing the market value of machinery and equipment by the price index. As a result, not 
only the quantity, but also the quality of machinery, is reflected in the quantity of 
machinery variable. Since the market value of machinery comes from the 5-year census, 
we use the same polynomial interpolation based on data from 1982 to 2012 to construct 
the annual data series. 
County level fertilizer quantity data come from the Offices of the State Chemist in 
both Indiana and Illinois. These offices record all reported sales of fertilizer by fertilizer 
companies and sales agents in each county. An ideal measurement of fertilizer quantity is 
the quantity of fertilizer applied to the field in each county; however, this data is largely 
unobservable. In the absence of observable fertilizer application data, the quantity sold is 
a reasonable measure. Given transportation and storage costs, most farmers do not 
purchase fertilizer from outside the county, or store purchased fertilizer for future use. 
Therefore, the fertilizer sales data is a reliable proxy for fertilizer used in each county. 
Since fertilizer application occurs after the sale, and the fall application of fertilizer is 





as the sum of fall sales from the previous year and spring sales from the current year. The 
fertilizer price data is the weighted average price of different types of fertilizers 
(specifically, 09-23-30, 10-10-10, 10-20-20,10-34-00, 11-52-00, 13-13-13, 16-20-00, 17-
17-17, 18-46-00, 19-19-19, Anhydrous Ammonia, Muriate of Potash 60% K20, Nitrogen 
solution 32%, Superphosphate 44-46%, and Urea 45%). Our calculation of the fertilizer 
price index follows the same criterion used by USDA NASS. 
The price of corn and soybeans is the cash price data for each crop, obtained from 
GeoGrain. The GeoGrain data is available at the grain elevator level, measured on 
monthly intervals. To construct county-level data, we obtain averaged cash prices across 
all elevators in each county; the data are averaged temporally to obtain annual prices. 
Since crop prices are unknown when farmers make production decisions during the 
planting season, we use crop prices from the previous year to measure the expected price 
in the current year.  
Theoretically the adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs is a continuous measurement. In 
empirical research it is common to deploy a discrete approximation: ?̇?𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 − 𝐾𝑡−1 (see, 
for example, Epstein and Denny 1983; Hsu and Chang 1990; Luh and Stefanou 1991, 
1993; Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 1992; Boetel et al. 2007).  
Table 3.1 provides a statistical description of the data. The table reveals that about 
72,000 hectares were planted in corn and soybeans on average, but that there is 
substantial variation in total area planted that ranges from 4,600 to 220,000 hectares. On 
average, about half of the total planted area is allocated to corn and the other half to 
soybeans. Corn price is, on average, 40 percent of the soybean price per metric ton, while 
corn production measured in metric tons is 3.2 times higher than soybean production. 
More importantly about 31,000 metric tons of fertilizer is applied, on average. 















Corn production in a county (metric tons) 354,075.5 214,078.4 1,509,022.6 9,497.4 
Soybean production in a county (metric tons) 109,590.4 55,750.4 368,297.8 5,045.8 
Corn price ($/metric ton) 92.0 21.0 145.9 67.4 
Soybean price ($/metric ton) 222.7 44.6 309.2 160.7 
Fertilizer quantity applied in a county (metric tons) 30,764.7 19,308.0 185,635.1 1,232.0 
Fertilizer price ($/metric ton) 391.9 161.2 740.4 228.0 
Hired labor (persons) 78.7 78.4 472.0 5.0 
Wage ($/week) 481.8 146.6 977.0 113.0 
Planting area of corn (hectares) 36,625.8 19,161.2 129,099.3 1,821.2 
Planting area of soybean (hectares) 35,107.3 16,215.5 106,840.8 2,306.8 
Land price ($/hectare) 7,694.5 1,830.7 16,143.1 3,628.0 
Total planting area of corn and soybean (hectares) 71,733.1 34,480.7 220,156.8 4,613.6 
Composite machinery quantity 442,184.7 176,923.3 1,325,330.6 49,602.2 
Composite machinery price 171.6 21.5 209.0 144.0 







We estimate the parameters in the system defined by Equations (3.6) and (3.7) via a 
fixed effect seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure. In total, after imposing the 
theoretically relevant cross-equation restrictions, there are 35 parameters. Given these 
parameter estimates, we can compute the short-term and long-term price elasticities and 
conduct our policy analysis. We report the parameter estimates and standard errors in 
Table E.1 in the appendix for reference. Our profit function specification provides 
significant flexibility (i.e., is able to capture a wide range of behavioral responses). The 
downside is that this specification results in estimation of a large number of parameters 
which, in combination with cross-equation restrictions, results in violation of the 
theoretical property of convexity of the profit function in a number of data points. This is 
relatively common in estimation of dual profit or cost functions (e.g., Lansink and 




3.4.1 Short-Term Adjustments 
Table 3.2 reports the short-term price elasticities for output (corn) and the variable 
inputs (fertilizer and labor), with respect to prices of the netputs and quasi-fixed inputs. 
The table is organized so that the rows represent each of the netput quantities, and the 
columns represent the netput and quasi-fixed input prices from which each of the 
elasticities are computed.  
Most partial effects are of the expected sign. Given our objective, we focus on the 
intensive and extensive margin changes for fertilizer application. The own price elasticity 
of corn is 0.30, indicating that a 1 percent increase in the price of corn relative to soybean 
induces a 0.30 percent increase in corn supply. The own price elasticity of fertilizer is -
0.96, which indicates that when the fertilizer price increases by 1 percent, the application 
of fertilizer decreases by 0.96 percent. This elasticity is statistically significant, and 
indicates that any policy that increases the price of fertilizer, such as taxing fertilizer use 
or subsidizing a reduction in fertilizer application, is an effective means of reducing 





Table 3.2: Estimates of the Short-Term Price Elasticity 
    Price 
 







0.30*** -0.34*** -0.01 -0.14*** 0.00 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
Fertilizer 
0.96*** -0.96*** -0.01 -0.40*** 0.55*** 
(0.24) (0.28) (0.04) (0.07) (0.19) 
Labor 
0.12 -0.07 -0.33*** -0.11 0.47** 
  
(0.21) (0.23) (0.08) (0.10) (0.20) 
All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed 
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **, 
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
 The elasticity value reported here reveals a negative link between fertilizer usage 
and its own price. Behind this negative effect is the physical relationship between 
nitrogen and corn yields. Evidence from the agronomic literature suggests that increased 
nitrogen application raises corn yields at a decreasing rate. Therefore producers would 
respond to changes in the price of fertilizer. Our elasticity is larger (in absolute value) 
than the elasticity that can be inferred from agronomic studies. In fact, in the study area, 
the elasticity suggested by agronomic studies based on field data is around -0.3 (Iowa 
State University, 2016). Differences are perhaps due to the level of aggregation. The 
economically optimal nitrogen rate (EONR) suggested by Iowa State extension services 
are based on field level information. The spatial unit of observation in this study is a 
county. Effects over an entire county incorporate a large heterogeneity in response. 
Typical agronomic units (as the ones considered to calculate the EONR) are included, but 
marginal units which tend to be more sensitive to changes in price are also included in 
our study.  
We also find that the short-term cross-price elasticities between corn and fertilizer 
are statistically significant. The short-term cross-price elasticity between the quantity of 
fertilizer and the price of corn is also close to 1; specifically, a 1 percent decrease in the 
relative price of corn leads to a 0.96 percent decrease in the application rate of fertilizer. 





price can also lead to a significant reduction in fertilizer application through adjustment 
in the application rate. The downside of reducing fertilizer application via land use 
adjustment is a reduction in corn production. In fact, a 1 percent increase in the price of 
fertilizer leads to a 0.34 percent reduction in the quantity of corn produced. 
In percentage terms the response in fertilizer application to either a decrease in the 
price of corn or an increase in the price of fertilizer is (statistically) the same. These 
results imply that policies directed towards decreasing the price of corn and policies 
directed towards increasing the price of fertilizer are equally effective in reducing 
fertilizer application, at least in the short-term. Estimated elasticities are consistent with 
prior expectations based on economic theory and agronomic relationships, lending 
credence to our empirical framework. Additionally, elasticity estimates imply that 
policies that increase the price of land or decrease the price of machinery can also 




3.4.2 Long-Term Adjustments 
In the long-term, both corn land area and machinery adjust to their optimal levels; 
these adjustments lead to further change in fertilizer application. The long-term elasticity 
estimates are reported in Table 3.3, and are not generally different from the short-term 
elasticity estimates in Table 3.2. From the short-term to the long-term the magnitude of 
the own-price elasticity of fertilizer increases only from -0.96 to -0.98, which means that 
most of the adjustment occurs within the short-term (i.e., one year) and at the intensive 
margin. In particular the additional effects from the adjustment in the two quasi-fixed 
inputs (i.e., the second terms in Equations (3.13) and (3.14)) are not substantial. This can 
be explained by a small elasticity of fertilizer with respect to corn acreage and machinery, 
a small elasticity of corn acreage with respect to netput prices and machinery prices, or 
by a mutual offsetting effect between these impacts. We explore these details in a 
subsequent section. 
Looking at elasticity estimates over different time horizons, it is clear that input-





and long-term. Our results are consistent with the findings from several studies that 
estimate the effects of input-based policies (Wu and Tanaka 2005; Taheripour et al. 2008; 
Bourgeois et al. 2014). However, other studies draw mixed conclusions. For example, 
while the fertilizer tax policies implemented in Austria and Sweden have been found to 
significantly reduce fertilizer application, the fertilizer taxes implemented in Denmark, 
Finland and Norway did not decrease fertilizer use significantly (Rougoor et al. 2001; 
Söderholm and Christiernsson 2008; Ahodo and Svatonova 2014). Explanations for the 
insignificance of the policy in these countries include a low tax rate, the recycling of tax 
revenue back to farmers, and the interaction of the policy effect with other policies, this 
insignificance nevertheless raises concern on the general effectiveness of input-based 
policies. Our results provide further evidence that input-based policies might significantly 
reduce fertilizer application. 
 
Table 3.3:  Estimates of the Long-Term Price Elasticity 
    Price 








0.29*** -0.34*** -0.01  -0.14*** 0.02 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
Fertilizer 
0.96*** -0.98*** -0.02 -0.40*** 0.60*** 
(0.25) (0.28) (0.04) (0.07) (0.19) 
Labor 
0.12 -0.08 -0.33*** -0.11 0.48** 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.08) (0.10) (0.20) 
Corn Land 
0.40*** -0.43*** -0.02 -0.02 0.25*** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) 
Machinery 
0.12 0.25** 0.05** 0.13** -1.27*** 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.02) (0.06) (0.22) 
All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed 
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **, 
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
We find similar insights with respect to policies that work by changing the relative 
price of corn (output-based policies); these policies also affect fertilizer application 
beyond the short-term through the adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs and, especially, land 
allocation. However the elasticity of fertilizer demand with respect to the price of corn 





elasticities) from the short-term to the long-term. Like input-based policies, output-based 
policies act primarily through the short-term at the intensive margin – i.e., a reduction in 
the fertilizer application rate.  
Our results also confirm that output-based policies that affect the relative prices of 
corn lead to adjustments in fertilizer application in the short-term and long-term, and are 
consistent with findings that a high corn price is one of the main drivers of high fertilizer 
application (Stuart et al. 2014) and high nitrogen loss to the water system (Hendricks et al. 
2014). Our findings provide support for the feasibility of the suggested policy of targeting 
a reduction in fertilizer use through the integration of environmental standards into 
government commodity program payments. All else equal, a higher compliance cost of 
corn production means a lower real price received by farmers, and consequently the 
change in the relative price of corn and soybeans will lead to a reduction of fertilizer use.  
Even in the long term, we continue to find that fertilizer application responds 
similarly to a decrease in the corn price or an increase in the fertilizer price. Hence, in 
both the short-term and the long-term, output-based (i.e., corn price) policies and input-





3.4.3 Cost-Effectiveness of Policies 
Even though the elasticity of fertilizer with respect to fertilizer price and crop price 
are similar, the cost of input- and output-based policies per unit of abatement differ. Our 
estimates indicate that input- and output-based policies take effect at the same speed; 
hence, our analysis on the relative cost-effectiveness of these policies focuses on the 
magnitude of the cost of the policies and the total effect. The average annual fertilizer 
application in our sample is 1,828,672 metric tons, the average fertilizer price is 
$392/metric ton, the average annual production of corn is 21,083,636 metric tons, and the 
average corn price is $92/metric ton. A 10 percent reduction in fertilizer application with 
an input-based policy (e.g., a tax on fertilizer) requires a 10.2 percent tax on each unit of 





10/0.98). This translates into a total cost of $73,146,880 (calculated as 1,828,672*392*(-
10/-0.98)/100). The same 10 percent reduction in fertilizer application via an output-
based policy (e.g., a tax on corn production) costs $202,051,512, which is almost three 
times larger than that of the input-based policy.   
These calculations indicate that, given our estimated elasticities, the cost to 
agricultural producers of achieving a reduction in fertilizer application is smaller with an 
input-based policy than with an output-based policy. Conversely, if the reduction in 
fertilizer application is encouraged through a subsidy instead of a tax, the cost to the 
policymaker of achieving a 10 percent reduction in fertilizer application is smaller if 
achieved through the input-based policy. These calculations reinforce the idea that input-
based policies are generally preferred. As we have discussed, the findings in previous 
studies that compare input- and output-based policies are mixed. Our results demonstrate 
that, at least for our study area, input-based policies are superior from a cost-effectiveness 
point of view. The advantage of the input-based policy may come from the fact that the 
input-based policy directly targets fertilizer; conversely, an output-based policy targets 
corn or soybean production, which is ultimately translated into a change in fertilizer 
application indirectly. It is likely that some of the adjustment induced by the output-based 




3.4.4 Decomposing Long-Term Adjustments 
Two components contribute to the difference between the short- and long-term 
elasticities: the adjustment of land allocation and the adjustment of capital. We are 
especially interested in the adjustment of land allocation since it represents the vehicle 
through which price policies affect fertilizer application at the extensive margin. While 
the (small) magnitude of these effects can be explained by a small effect of each of these 
components, it could also be the result of an offsetting effect. We analyze each 
component to ascertain whether there are any differential effects on fertilizer application 
via either of these channels. Tables 4 and 5 report the estimates of the components of the 





Table 3.3 shows that less land is used for planting corn when the corn price is lower 
or when the fertilizer price is higher. Policies directed towards the prices of corn and 
fertilizer influence land allocation adjustments from corn to soybeans, which further 
decreases fertilizer application. Table 3.4 shows that a 1 percent decrease in the corn 
price and a 1 percent increase in the fertilizer price cause a 0.006 percent and 0.007 
percent decrease in fertilizer application respectively by decreasing the land allocated to 
corn. Hence, the magnitude of this extensive margin effect is trivial compared to the 
intensive margin effects, and the effects of output- and input-based policies are similar in 
magnitude (at least in terms of the point estimate). 
 
Table 3.4:  Estimates of the Long-Term Price Elasticity from Adjustment in Land 
Allocation 
    Price 
 








-0.008*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.000 -0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Fertilizer 
0.006** -0.007** -0.000 -0.000 0.004** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Labor 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed 
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **, 
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
A change in either the price of corn or the price of fertilizer also stimulates 
adjustment of capital, which in turn affects fertilizer use. Table 3.5 shows that the cross-
price elasticity of fertilizer application with respect to the corn price related to an 
adjustment in capital is not significant. The own-price elasticity of fertilizer related to an 
adjustment in capital is significant, but its magnitude is still small, only -0.009, which 











3.4.5 Temporal Adjustment Rates of Quasi-Fixed Inputs 
Another important dimension to analyze is the time it takes for adjustments to fully 
take place. Table 3.6 contains estimates of the adjustment rates of the quasi-fixed inputs. 
As Equation (3.8) indicates, the adjustment rate is the proportion of the total desired 
adjustment (i.e., adjustment to the optimal level of quasi-fixed inputs) that unravels 
within a year. Results indicate that the adjustment rate of corn land is -1.17, which means 
that the entire adjustment in land allocation to the optimal level can be completed in one 
year; further, this estimate indicates slight over-adjustment as the (absolute) value is 
greater than 1.  
 
Table 3.5:  Estimates of the Long-Term Price Elasticity from Adjustment in Capital 
    Price 
 








-0.002 -0.004* -0.001* -0.002* 0.021*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) 
Fertilizer 
-0.004 -0.009* -0.002* -0.004 0.044*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.016) 
Labor 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.011 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) 
All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed 
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **, 
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
This rate of adjustment in land allocation may appear to be rapid compared to the 
findings of other studies, which usually indicate multiple years of dynamic adjustment 
(Vasavada and Chambers 1986; Lansink and Stefanou 1997). Yet, in the Wabash River 
Watershed the two main crops – corn and soybeans – are traditionally grown in rotation, 
making it easy for farmers to switch production between corn and soybeans. This case is 
different from that considered in other studies; for example, rootcrops and other outputs 
in Lansink and Stefanou (1997). Furthermore, since our data are county level data, while 
the adjustment of land allocation could be sluggish for a certain farmer due to reasons 
such as rotational requirements or contractual restrictions, county-wide adjustments are 
more flexible because the adjustment only requires some farmers to re-allocate land. 





level quickly once the most responsive farmers adjust their production. The rapid rate of 
adjustment in land allocation indicates that the extensive margin effects of price policies 
take place quickly, and so the time required for desirable behavioral changes at a policy-
relevant level of aggregation is not a concern. 
 
Table 3.6: Estimated Rates of Adjustment for Quasi-Fixed Factors 







All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed 
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **, 
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
Table 3.6 shows that in contrast to land allocation the adjustment in capital stock is 
slow. Only about 13 percent of the total desired adjustment is completed in a year, so it 
requires about 8 years for capital to adjust to its optimal level after a policy-driven shock. 
This estimate is similar to those found by Chang and Stefanou (1988) and Lansink and 
Stefanou (1997). However, given that the capital adjustment component in the long-term 
elasticity of fertilizer is small (i.e., the evolution of capital does not significantly 
influence the evolution of fertilizer application as revealed by our results), this slow rate 
of capital adjustment does not substantially impact the time-frame for the realization of 
the policy goals. 
It is important to point out that the rapid adjustment of land allocation and the small 
difference between the short-term and long-term elasticities indicates that, in our study 
area, the landscape displays a high speed of adjustment to input- and output-based 
policies. Therefore input- and output-based instruments are on equal footing, with no 
instrument prevailing over the other in terms of the time elapsed between implementation 
and effect. We bear in mind that our study is conducted at a county-level in an area in 
which corn and soybeans are grown on rotation; both factors explain, in part, this rapid 
adjustment, and also imply that our findings do not necessarily translate into other 





results should not be taken as general indication that speed of adjustment is not relevant 





Economists often advocate input-based and output-based economic policies to 
reduce water pollution from fertilizer use. Input-based economic incentives consist of 
taxing the use of fertilizer or subsidizing a reduction in fertilizer application. Output-
based incentives consist of taxing fertilizer-intensive crops (e.g., corn) or subsidizing 
fertilizer-saving crops (e.g., soybeans). Both types of policies affect fertilizer use by 
influencing the fertilizer application rate directly in the short-term and/or indirectly 
through the adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs (i.e., land re-allocation) in the long-term. 
Though the direct effect occurs in a single year, the indirect effect may require more time 
if quasi-fixed factors adjust slowly. For policymakers, both the monetary cost and speed 
of effectiveness are important policy considerations. Hence, a complete assessment of the 
relative cost-effectiveness of these two types of policies considers both the monetary cost 
and the speed of adjustment. 
Consistent with theory and past research, we find that both input- and output-based 
policies lead to a significant reduction in fertilizer application, but input-based policies 
are more cost-effective than output-based policies. In terms of the speed at which they 
take effect, the two types of policies are similar to each other; in particular, both types of 
policies take effect rapidly – i.e., from one year to the next. Hence, adjustment in land 
allocation is not time costly, implying that policies that operate through this channel are 
not time costly either. One explanation for our result is that, since we focus on the Corn 
Belt where corn and soybean are only two main crops, land allocation adjustments 
between corn and soybeans are relatively easy for farmers who typically grow these crops 
on rotation. We also find that much of the total effect of these policies occurs through 
changes at the intensive margin (i.e., the reduction in the application rate of fertilizer), 
while the effect through the extensive margin (i.e., the effects from adjustments of land 





Three limits of this study should be mentioned. First, county-level fertilizer 
application data is not available; instead, we use county level fertilizer sales data. We 
maintain that, at least in our study area, fertilizer sales data is a good proxy for 
application data; yet, there is likely some error in measurement. Second, because the 
temporal dimension in our data is limited because of fertilizer data availability, our 
analysis assumes static expectation of prices which amounts to a restriction that farmers 
do not fully consider price uncertainty. Future analysis may relax this assumption. Third, 
this study ignores the possibility that some farmers may respond to adverse 
environmental-climate conditions by increasing fertilizer application. Incorporating risk-
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CHAPTER 4 HYBRIDS AND HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR 





The United States government has spent millions of dollars since 2006 encouraging 
household consumers to purchase fuel efficient vehicles, largely in response to oil price 
shocks and rising GHG emissions from fossil fuel dependent transportation since 1990 
(EPA 2015). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided a substantial income tax credit for 
gasoline-electric hybrids, and over the 2000's decade, gasoline-electric hybrids became 
nearly synonymous with high fuel efficiency – e.g., the Toyota Prius or Honda Civic 
hybrid. Calculations by Sallee (2011), for instance, indicate that the 2007 third quarter 
cost of these incentives was nearly 800 million dollars. More recently, the Energy 
Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provides similar tax credit incentives for plug-in 
electric vehicles, clearly indicating a continued policy focus on increasing the 
proliferation of alternative-fuel vehicles.8 
 The purpose of these policies is twofold. At a household level, the goal is to reduce 
gasoline consumption by encouraging households to drive hybrids. At a market level, the 
proponents of these policies hope to stimulate widespread adoption of hybrids that may 
otherwise take a relatively long period of time to gain traction in the market; the spread of 
hybrids could lead to a higher level of fuel saving in the future. It is important to 
understand whether these policies can be successful in both aspects – in reducing 
gasoline consumption for households that choose to buy hybrids, and in jump-starting the 
hybrid car market. Yet, as described by Allcott and Mullainathan (2010), a critical, 
though sometimes overlooked, aspect of this policy discussion regards the interaction 
                                                          
8  More information on the Plug-In Electric Drive Vehicle Credit can be found at 






between behavioral drivers of demand – e.g., biocentrism, egoism, guilt, and social status 
– and these two policy outcomes. Reliable policy assessment requires the counterfactual; 
these non-trivial, and largely unobservable, behavioral factors make the counterfactual 
elusive. Our interest in this paper is to disentangle several behavioral drivers of hybrid 
vehicle demand, in order to assess the extent to which certain behavioral motives explain 
hybrid ownership and driving habits, and to generate insight into the efficacy of these 
incentive-type policies.  
We bear in mind the following points in our assessment of the impact of hybrid 
ownership on fuel savings. First, for the proliferation of hybrid ownership to lead to 
(large) reductions in fuel consumption, it should be the case that a household that owns a 
hybrid will not increase its driving miles to the extent that the fuel savings from driving 
the hybrid are substantially offset; i.e., there is no (substantial) rebound effect. Otherwise, 
the proliferation of hybrid vehicles would not lead to the expected reduction in fuel 
consumption. Second, we focus on both individual and social incentives (pressure) that 
correlate with hybrid ownership and driving habits. If hybrid ownership was random 
throughout the population, and it could be observed that the average hybrid driver 
consumes less gasoline relative to the average non-hybrid driver, a policy designed to 
encourage hybrid ownership across a larger segment of the population would likely 
generate a significant reduction in gasoline consumption. Yet, hybrid ownership is not 
random, and the counterfactual in terms of driving habits for hybrid owners is not known. 
For example, if a household that purchases a hybrid has biocentric preferences, fuel 
savings may stem primarily from these preferences and not hybrid ownership per se. This 
situation would imply that continued proliferation of hybrid vehicles may quickly lead 
only to marginal fuel savings at best, as the preferences of marginal consumers became 
less biocentric.9 Given the complexity of these demand drivers, our starting point is the 
recent theoretical and empirical work linking behavioral and environmental economics 
(Kotchen and Moore 2007, Allcott and Mullainathan 2010, Allcott 2011, Jacobsen et al. 
2012, Sexton and Sexton 2014, Delgado and Khanna 2015, Delgado et al. 2015), which 
                                                          
9 Assume, for the sake of argument, that consumer preferences are uniformly distributed over a continuous 
range of biocentrism, such that the endpoints represent zero and complete biocentrism. Biocentrism 





motivates our perspective that, not only is the choice to buy a hybrid not random, it 
depends on factors that also affect the driving behavior of households. A major 
contribution of this paper is developing estimates that allow us to disentangle some of 
these complex behavioral demand issues, and gain insight into the relationship between 
hybrid vehicles and fuel consumption. 
The socially-oriented behavioral motives also bear important implications for the 
broader goal of trying to stimulate widespread proliferation of hybrid vehicles in the 
consumer market. This may generally boil down to social status effects – the desire to 
maintain one's relative standing among peers, or to adhere to (local) biocentric social 
norms. Recent research (Narayanan and Nair 2013, Sexton and Sexton 2014, Delgado et 
al. 2015) has identified these social effects to be an important and statistically significant 
factor underlying part of the proliferation of the highly visible Toyota Prius. Unlike non-
social behavioral factors, the social factors bear important implications for the efficacy of 
a policy that tries to jump-start the consumer market. On the one hand, the social 
incentives can increase the speed at which such policies stimulate markets – the policy 
provides a first incentive, but social incentives quickly kick in to augment the policy. The 
result may be a rapid proliferation of hybrid vehicles. Yet, on the other hand, the same 
social incentive creates a potential rebound effect – in order to capitalize on the social 
value of buying the hybrid, a household has an incentive to drive the hybrid more. The 
result is the potential to undo, to an unknown extent, the benefits of hybrid vehicle 
proliferation. We follow previous research and focus exclusively on the popular Toyota 
Prius to assess the extent to which this socially-driven rebound effect exists, as this focus 
provides the most plausible means of identifying this social-status driven rebound effect. 
We use a matching approach to identify and estimate the average treatment effect of 
hybrid ownership on treated (i.e., hybrid owning) households. The fact that some factors 
affect both the household decision to adopt a hybrid and its driving behavior leads to 
selection bias. This selection may stem from some factors that are easily observed. For 
instance, since hybrid vehicles are more expensive than conventional-engine counterparts, 
we expect that individuals with higher income are more likely to drive a hybrid. Standard 





observable effects. Yet, the behavioral demand discussion implies that there are largely 
unobservable factors, which include personal factors (biocentrism, egoism, guilt, or cost-
saving) as well as social factors (social status or social environmental 
awareness/pressure). These factors are important because they influence both hybrid 
ownership as well as driving habits; these individuals would likely consume less gasoline 
in the counterfactual scenario in which they did not own a hybrid. To deal with the 
selection coming from these factors that are difficult to observe, we develop indicators to 
measure them indirectly. We require that our matching procedure match exactly on 
geographic location to ensure that the hybrid and non-hybrid matched pairs face the same 
social incentives for hybrid adoption. In addition, we include the average MPG rating of 
all other vehicles in the household in our nearest-neighbor covariate matching set, so as 
to ensure that matched households have similar underlying preferences for cost saving 
and environmental preservation. We describe these details more fully in Section 4.4. 
We find that, on average, a hybrid household drives more miles per year than the 
average non-hybrid household. However, this rebound effect is only about 3 percent of 
the total annual miles traveled, and is insufficient to offset the fuel savings due to the 
higher fuel efficiency of the gasoline-electric hybrid engine. Therefore, there is a 
substantial fuel saving generated by hybrid adoption. We do not find evidence that the 
miles traveled for Prius households are significantly different from non-Prius hybrid 
households, which indicates that there is not a statistically identifiable social-status driven 




4.2 Summary of Related Research 
 
 
4.2.1 Factors that Influence Hybrid Vehicle Adoption 
Recent work has emphasized the importance of behavioral, social, and financial 
incentives underlying hybrid vehicle adoption. While there certainly may be other factors 
that correlate with hybrid vehicle adoption, such as income, education, or age (Ozaki and 





and straightforward to control for econometrically. Hence, our discussion focuses on 
more complex incentives. 
Fuel Efficiency  Hybrid vehicles are designed to be more fuel efficient than 
comparable conventional engine vehicles, leading to a reduction in fuel costs. Research 
(Heffner 2005, Klein 2007) has found that improved gas mileage is a significant factor 
underlying hybrid adoption, and may be especially important for a household that 
depends greatly on personal vehicle travel; for instance, a relatively long commute, 
and/or no easy access to public transportation. 
Personal Preference for Environmental Quality  There is a growing consensus 
that a substantial number of consumers value environmental quality, for reasons not 
limited to altruism, egoism, guilt, or off-setting; see, for example, Kotchen (2005, 2006, 
2009), Kotchen and Moore (2007), and Jacobsen et al. (2012). Delgado and Khanna 
(2015) describe these motives from a general theoretical framework. The relevant insight 
from these papers is a recognition that consumer preferences for environmentally friendly 
products – which includes hybrid vehicles – are significant drivers of such consumer 
demand (Kahn 2007), and that these preferences are largely unobservable and difficult to 
disentangle (Delgado et al. 2015). Nevertheless, these preferences render hybrid 
ownership non-random in a population of consumers, and without careful consideration, 
these differences might lead to substantial bias in treatment parameter estimates. 
Openness to New Technology  Turrentine and Kurani (2007) and Ozaki and 
Sevastyanova (2011) find evidence that consumers who adopt hybrid vehicles are those 
who enjoy pioneering new technology. This characteristic is less frequently discussed as 
a factor underlying hybrid vehicle adoption; yet, the gasoline-electric hybrid is not a 
trivial evolution in personal automobiles and is a symbol of new technology and bears 
substantial uncertainty in terms of reliability and performance. 
Rising Gasoline Prices  Gasoline prices largely rose over the 2000s decade, and the 
impact of rising gasoline prices on hybrid adoption has been repeatedly confirmed. 
Rising gasoline prices have led to an increase in the hybrid vehicle market share in both 
the United States (Diamond 2009, Beresteanu and Li 2011) and the United Kingdom 





Hybrid Vehicle Diffusion  Another motive underlying hybrid vehicle adoption that 
is closely linked to social and behavioral incentives, as well as government program 
incentives, is hybrid vehicle diffusion into the consumer automobile market. As hybrid 
vehicles become more commonplace, consumers feel more confident that hybrid 
technology is reliable and grow more comfortable with the idea of driving a hybrid 
vehicle. Narayanan and Nair (2013) find a positive and significant effect of past hybrid 
vehicle adoption on current hybrid vehicle adoption for the Toyota Prius. Heutel and 
Muehlegger (2014) study the impact of a cumulative hybrid vehicle penetration rate for 
the Toyota Prius and Honda Insight on hybrid vehicle sales, and find a positive impact for 
the Prius and a negative impact for the Insight; hybrid vehicle diffusion depends on the 
perceived quality of the new technology. Mau et al. (2008) and Axsen et al. (2009) report 
similar findings.   
Social Norms  There is a growing consensus that social factors may be a significant 
motive behind hybrid vehicle adoption. Hybrid owners may earn positive social status in 
an environment in which there are social norms that include valuation of environmental 
amenities. Others may feel social pressure to conform to these social norms. Ozaki and 
Sevastyanova (2011) find that social orientation, the willingness to comply with social 
norms, and peer effects are important factors motivating purchase of a Toyota Prius in the 
United Kingdom. Kahn (2007) finds that people living in a more environmental friendly 
community are more likely to adopt a hybrid. Research has generated compelling 
evidence that consumers use hybrid vehicles (particularly the Toyota Prius) as a tool to 
signal their social awareness, responsibility, and concern for others (Heffner et al. 2005, 
Heffner et al. 2007, Axsen et al. 2009, Sexton and Sexton 2014, Delgado et al. 2015).    
Government Sponsored Financial Incentives  As mentioned in the introduction, 
the federal government (and some state governments) have spent large sums of money 
encouraging household consumers to invest in hybrid vehicles.10 The general belief is 
that these incentives are largely effective, though empirical results are not unanimous. 
Chandra et al. (2010), Ozaki and Sevastyanova (2011), Beresteanu and Li (2011), and 
Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) find evidence that government incentives (such as tax 
                                                          
10 Borenstein and Davis (2015) review a variety of federal government incentives designed to encourage 





incentives or traffic policies) significantly impact hybrid adoption, though the impact 
may be smaller than that of a modest increase in gasoline prices (Beresteanu and Li 2011) 
or may vary by type and size of the incentive (Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011). 
Identification of the effect of these incentives is difficult given that these incentives are 
collinear with time trends, are aggregate across a dataset of household individuals, and 
because the effects may be confounded by consumer self-selection into the hybrid market 
leading to free-riding on these policies (Chandra et al. 2010). Diamond (2009) does not 




4.2.2 Factors that Influence Household Driving Habits 
Personal Preferences and Social Norms  The same individual/household and social 
behavioral factors that influence the decision to adopt a hybrid vehicle may also influence 
the annual miles traveled by each household. Households that have a stronger motivation 
to drive a hybrid may have a stronger motivation to drive more or less. For example, 
while a household that purchases a hybrid because of a long commute tends to drive more 
than others, a household that purchases a hybrid to reduce travel costs or minimize its 
environmental footprint may drive less. Particularly, a household motivated to drive a 
hybrid for social status concerns may have an incentive to drive more in order to 
capitalize on the social value of the hybrid. Indeed, an interesting aspect that we explore 
in this paper, is whether social factors also create an incentive to increase driving miles. 




4.2.3 The Rebound Effect 
The adoption of energy efficient technology raises concern of a rebound effect, 
which means that consumers respond to the increased efficiency, in part, by increasing 
usage (Chan and Gillingham 2015). The proliferation of hybrid vehicles that achieve 
significantly higher miles per gallon raises concern that hybrid owners may drive more in 





the same household does not own a hybrid. This concern is not without merit, and 
researchers have been trying to address this issue theoretically and empirically.  
Much of the literature addressing the rebound effect focuses on general 
improvements in fuel efficiency, and not hybrid adoption specifically. Further, much of 
this research was conducted prior to 2005. Some of these earlier studies use aggregated 
macro data and estimate rebound effects ranging from 5 percent to 31 percent (Greene 
1992; Jones 1993; Haughton and Sarkar 1996). Others use micro data and find 
substantially varying rebound effects. Goldberg (1998) and Greene et al. (1999) estimate 
the rebound effect to be 20 percent and 23 percent, respectively; the lowest rebound 
effect is found by Pickrell and Schimek (1999) to be 4 percent; the highest is found by 
West (2004) to be 87 percent. 
More recently, Small and Van Dender (2007) measure the rebound effect of travel 
distance from an increase in fuel efficiency at the state level in the United States from 
1966-2001 and 1997-2001. They estimate short term rebound effects of 4.5 percent 
(1966-2001) and 2.2 percent (1997-2001), and long term rebound effects of 22.2 percent 
(1966-2001) and 10.7 percent (1997-2001). Hymel et al. (2010) extend the research 
period to 1966-2004 and find the rebound effects are 4.7 percent and 24.1 percent in the 
short term and long term, respectively. Using Canadian data, Barla et al. (2009) estimate 
a short term rebound effect of 8 percent and a long term rebound effect of 20 percent. 
Wang et al. (2012) estimate the rebound effect to be as high as 96 percent in urban China. 
However, one caveat of these studies is that they measure the response of travel 
distance to the improvement of fuel efficiency by measuring the response of travel 
distance to a decrease in fuel cost. Specifically, they estimate the rebound effect of travel 
distance with regard to fuel efficiency by calculating the elasticity of travel distance to a 
change in fuel cost (per mile). The assumption behind this method is that consumers 
respond to an improvement in fuel efficiency and to a decrease in fuel price in exactly 
same way. However, this assumption may not be valid because consumers usually 
respond less to an increase in fuel efficiency than a decrease in fuel price (Gillingham 
2011). With U.S. national time series data, Greene (2012) rejects the null hypothesis that 





and opposite in sign, and while consumers’ response to fuel price is significant, their 
response in travel distance to fuel economy is not. Therefore, a rebound effect measured 
by the elasticity of travel distance with regard to fuel cost may be overestimated. 
Greene (2012) confirms the difference in the rebound effect of travel distance to fuel 
economy and fuel cost and separates them to estimate the pure rebound effect of fuel 
economy. However, he still calculates the elasticity of travel distance to a change in fuel 
economy, and measures the rebound effect at a macro level. Hence, there are two main 
differences between our study and Greene (2012). First, we pursue a new method, 
covariate matching, to directly compare the driving distances of households that are same 
to each other at all characteristics except the fuel efficiency of the vehicle they drive. 
Through matching households facing the same fuel price, we separate the effect of fuel 
efficiency from the effect of fuel price.  Second, our study is conducted at the household 
level, which provides a micro level rebound effect (it is not clear the extent to which 
aggregation to a macro level affects estimates of the rebound effect.) 
Another difference between our work and previous studies is that we focus on the 
rebound effect of an improvement in fuel efficiency from a special type of vehicles, 
hybrid vehicles, instead of a general improvement in fuel efficiency. Some hybrid 
vehicles are different from general higher fuel efficiency vehicles because their 
distinctive look endows them with a special value, a social signaling value, which signals 
social norms and affects the social status of drivers. The special social signaling value 
may induce an additional rebound effect, which may differentiate the rebound effect of 
hybrid adoption from the rebound effect of a general improvement in fuel efficiency.  
As far as we know, there are only a few studies that focus on hybrid adoption 
specifically to measure the rebound effect. de Haan et al. (2006) and de Haan et al. (2007) 
use a sample of Toyota Prius buyers in Switzerland to investigate whether households 
switch to the hybrid from a smaller vehicle, and whether vehicle ownership might 
increase. They do not find evidence to suggest that either of these two rebound effects are 
significant. Given limitations in their data, they do not investigate whether Prius buyers 
drive more than non-hybrid owners; this latter effect, however, is more likely according 





4.2.4 Social Status Driven Rebound Effect 
One characteristic of hybrid vehicles is higher fuel efficiency, which may induce a 
rebound effect of hybrid ownership similar to the rebound effect from a general 
improvement of fuel efficiency.  Some hybrid vehicles, however, have another 
characteristic: they are instantly recognizable as being fuel-efficient hybrids. This leads to 
a new kind of rebound effect, which is distinct from a general improvement in fuel 
efficiency. Because (some) hybrid vehicles are recognizable, the driver is able to signal 
his/her social awareness, responsibility, and concern for others (Heffner et al. 2005, 
Heffner et al. 2007, Axsen et al. 2009, Sexton and Sexton 2014, Delgado et al. 2015). 
This social signal value may motivate the drivers of these hybrids to drive more in order 
to send signals; this leads to a special rebound effect, a social status driven rebound effect. 
Identifying the existence of this status signaling rebound effect is important for 
understanding whether hybrid adoption leads to same degree of fuel saving as a general 
improvement of fuel efficiency.  
However, isolating the social status driven rebound effect is not simple since any 
change in travel distance coming from hybrid adoption could be the combination of the 
two rebound effects. Our strategy is to explore the existence of the social status driven 
rebound effect through comparison of household annual miles traveled for those that 
drive the Toyota Prius with those that drive other hybrid vehicles. This strategy arises 
from the fact that the physical look of most hybrid vehicles is not distinct from non-
hybrid counterpart vehicles. The Toyota Prius, on the other hand, does not have a non-
hybrid counterpart, and further was designed to be visually distinct from all other 
vehicles available during the 2000s decade. That is, while most hybrid vehicles can only 
be identified from their non-hybrid counterparts by the hybrid label on the rear of the car, 
the Prius is instantly recognizable. As is clear from the literature, households are willing 
to pay for the symbolic benefit of the Toyota Prius in order to signal their environmental 
status. Several studies quantify the value of this status signal: Sexton and Sexton (2014) 
calculate this status value as being between $420 and $4,200, and Delgado et al. (2015) 






Given the unique signaling value of the Toyota Prius, if there exists a social status 
rebound effect driven by this signaling value, we expect to find it when we compare the 
adoption of the Prius to the adoption of other hybrid vehicles. Conversely, if we cannot 
find a significant social status driven rebound effect from Prius adoption compared to 
regular hybrid adoption, we are able to conclude that there is no significant social status 




4.3 Reduced Form Evidence 
Before developing our empirical model, we begin with a brief reduced form analysis 
to describe the patterns in our data. Understanding these patterns is important for later 
assessment of the ability of our preferred matching approach to eliminating any covariate 
imbalance between hybrid and non-hybrid households. 
Factors That Correlate With Hybrid Ownership  We first explore factors that 
correlate with hybrid ownership via probit regression of a hybrid ownership indicator on 
household demographics, the availability of government (federal and state) incentives, 
local (city-level) gasoline prices, geographic controls, and year fixed effects. The data is 
described in detail in Section 4.5; we report these results in Table 4.1. 
We find that many common stereotypes hold in our data: hybrid owners tend to have 
relatively high income, have a graduate education, are frequent internet users, and have 
fewer family members. We find that households that have higher MPG ratings on other 
vehicles in the household are also more likely to own a hybrid, which suggests 







Table 4.1: Probit Estimates of the Propensity Score of Hybrid/Prius Ownership 
  Hybrid Adoption Prius Adoption 
Constant −4.935*** (0.444) −1.372 (1.094) 
Middle Income 0.069 (0.043) −0.047 (0.133) 
High Income 0.297*** (0.045) −0.232* (0.136) 
High School Degree −0.230 (0.209) 0.347 (0.796) 
Associate’s Degree 0.007 (0.204) 0.564 (0.775) 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.118 (0.204) 0.656 (0.773) 
Graduate Degree 0.365* (0.204) 0.872 (0.772) 
No. of Vehicles 0.004 (0.022) 0.107* (0.060) 
Household Size −0.067*** (0.016) 0.015 (0.046) 
Average Age 0.020*** (0.008) −0.020 (0.022) 
Average Age Squared −0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0002) 
Share of Female Drivers −0.079 (0.062) 0.134 (0.174) 
Internet Usage 0.243*** (0.053) 0.322* (0.169) 
Average Vehicle MPG 0.030*** (0.003) 0.027*** (0.006) 
Commute Distance 0.0001 (0.001) −0.0001 (0.002) 
Federal Incentive 0.091** (0.046) −0.077 (0.126) 
State Incentive −0.009 (0.033) 0.076 (0.078) 
HOV Lane Access −0.059* (0.031) 0.030 (0.086) 
Gas Price 0.136*** (0.042) 0.217* (0.112) 
Urban 0.012 (0.032) −0.139 (0.092) 
Mid-Size MSA −0.159*** (0.037) −0.153 (0.098) 
Small MSA −0.187*** (0.039) −0.143 (0.106) 
Not in MSA −0.234*** (0.049) 0.051 (0.138) 
2002 Indicator 0.914*** (0.324) 
 
2003 Indicator 0.985*** (0.320) −0.575* (0.341) 
2004 Indicator 1.168*** (0.317) −0.029 (0.312) 
2005 Indicator 1.288*** (0.316) −0.301 (0.308) 
2006 Indicator 1.162*** (0.335) −0.571 (0.434) 
2007 Indicator 1.394*** (0.320) −0.645* (0.333) 
2008 Indicator 1.391*** (0.322) −0.737** (0.349) 
2009 Indicator 1.144*** (0.374) −6.058 (87.334) 
Observations 36,780 1,285 
Log Likelihood -5,017.169 -826.755 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,096.338 1,713.511 
Range of support [0.000,0.458] [0.000,0.953] 
Middle income is defined as income between $50,000 and $100,000 per year, and high income is defined 
as annual household income above $100,000. The range of support at the bottom of the table indicates the 
range of support of the estimated propensity score for each model. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level is denoted with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. In the Prius adoption model, both 2001 and 2002 
year indicators are used as the base category because there are too few households in the data that





Table 4.2: OLS Estimates of Annual Miles Traveled for Hybrid/Prius Adoption 
  Hybrid Prius 
Constant 1,013.50 (6,218.80) 3,425.52 (35,493.17) 
Hybrid/Prius Adoption 914.28*** (341.55) −800.94 (665.76) 
Middle Income 1,284.93*** (168.94) 544.83 (1,167.21) 
High Income 2,897.99*** (196.02) 2,591.68** (1,194.54) 
High School Degree −98.15 (630.64) 6,225.19 (5,910.51) 
Associate’s Degree 932.56 (626.03) 9,140.24 (5,717.48) 
Bachelor’s Degree 720.07 (630.34) 8,751.38 (5,704.42) 
Graduate Degree 796.81 (633.46) 9,200.45 (5,700.19) 
No. of Vehicles 7,305.19*** (101.13) 8,288.42*** (524.99) 
Household Size 1,304.51*** (70.25) 822.43** (409.35) 
Average Age 185.28*** (33.32) 180.98 (193.36) 
Average Age Squared −3.12*** (0.31) −2.92 (1.78) 
Share of Female Drivers 42.50 (273.07) −310.17 (1,527.74) 
Internet Usage 954.46*** (188.98) −1,109.45 (1,479.80) 
Average Vehicle MPG −30.79** (14.02) −0.46 (44.96) 
Commute Distance 164.16*** (3.94) 190.82*** (19.02) 
Gas Price −1,054.90 (1,588.37) −7,839.47 (9,023.96) 
Urban −1,826.30*** (148.24) −1,567.92* (817.35) 
Mid-Size MSA 608.97*** (224.62) 787.50 (996.85) 
Small MSA 1,155.14*** (224.77) 435.04 (1,078.01) 
Not in MSA 2,742.35*** (251.10) 3,227.70** (1,308.28) 
Observations 36,780 1,285 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
R2 0.33 0.43 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.40 
Residual Std. Error 11,846.46 11,184.06 
F Statistic 265.99*** 14.48*** 
Middle income is defined as income between $50,000 and $100,000 per year, and high income is defined 
as annual household income above $100,000. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is 






Table 4.1 shows that federal tax incentives (see Appendix F for details) are 
positively correlated with hybrid ownership (Sallee 2011). We do not find that state level 
incentives are significant, and we find that HOV lane privileges are negatively related to 
hybrid ownership.11  We also find that gasoline prices are positively correlated with 
hybrid adoption, as is MSA city size. Finally, our time dummies reveal an increasing 
trend in hybrid adoption over time. 
In the last column in Table 4.1 we restrict the sample to hybrid owning households, 
and look for differences between Prius owning households and non-Prius hybrid 
households. The table reveals that there are few significant differences between Prius 
households and non-Prius hybrid households. We see that Prius households are less likely 
to be in the highest income category, have more vehicles, are frequent internet users, and 
average a higher MPG rating on other vehicles in the household. We suspect that the 
income effect comes from the presence of luxury hybrids in the dataset: the highest 
income hybrid consumers are more likely to buy a Toyota Camry hybrid than a Prius. 
Factors That Correlate with Annual Miles Traveled  In Table 4.2 we report 
reduced form least squares estimates from the regression of annual miles traveled on the 
hybrid ownership indicator and control variables. We find that the hybrid indicator is 
positive and statistically significant, which indicates that hybrid ownership correlates 
positively with annual miles traveled. The point estimate implies that hybrid owning 
households, all else constant, drive nearly 915 miles more per year compared to non-
hybrid households. The last column in Table 4.2 reveals that there is not a significant 
difference in annual miles traveled between Prius households and non-Prius hybrid 
households. 
Many other control variables in the hybrid adoption model are significant, and take 
the expected sign. We see that an increase in income correlates with an increase in annual 
miles traveled, and that annual miles traveled is increasing with age, though at a 
decreasing rate. Other point estimates indicate that households in the largest MSAs (the 
                                                          
11 It is likely that certain state level policies are endogenous to hybrid ownership, which leads to a negative 
correlation between HOV lane access and hybrid ownership. For example, a state with lower adoption rate 
of hybrid vehicles may have stronger motivation to provide HOV lane access to hybrids, in order to 





base group) average fewer driving miles per year, and households with higher MPG 
ratings on other vehicles drive fewer miles per year. 
As in the probit adoption models, we do not find much significant difference 
between Prius households and non-Prius hybrid households in terms of annual miles 
traveled. In this model, we find that annual miles traveled is increasing in income, the 
number of vehicles, household size, and the length of commute. 
The reduced form least squares estimates provide basic information on variables 
related to hybrid/Prius adoption and annual miles traveled of households. However, our 
analysis does not entirely rely on these since the reduced forms are limited by the 
assumed functional form and are not able to incorporate all critical influencing factors 




4.4 Model, Identification, and Estimation 
 
 
4.4.1 Hybrid Rebound Effects 
We are interested in understanding the relationship between household ownership of 
a gasoline-electric hybrid vehicle and annual vehicle miles traveled.  
Proposition 1    Ownership of a gasoline-electric hybrid vehicle leads to an increase 
in the number of household vehicle miles traveled in a year. 
In line with theoretical insight (Chan and Gillingham 2015), we expect that owners 
of gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles respond to the increase in fuel efficiency, in part, by 
increasing annual vehicle miles traveled. Yet, despite this intuition, it is not known to 
what extent hybrid owning households might increase annual miles traveled, especially 
when we consider that the adoption of a hybrid may induce a different rebound effect 
compared to general improvement of fuel efficiency. From understanding the potential 
for a rebound effect, we can understand the extent to which potential fuel savings from 





Proposition 2    There exists a social-status driven rebound effect associated with 
the Toyota Prius. 
We postulate that a household that owns a Toyota Prius has an incentive to increase 
its driving in order to fully capture the social-status benefits afforded by the Prius. 
Research has shown that the Toyota Prius signals environmental social status (Sexton and 
Sexton 2014, Delgado et al. 2015), and we conjecture that the signaling ability of the 
Prius is fully realized by maximum driving exposure. This social-status rebound effect 
has not yet been given direct attention (e.g., status effects are excluded by Chan and 
Gillingham 2015, p. 141). We believe in the context of hybrid cars this effect may be 
important. Further, we can understand the degree to which social status effects that serve 
to increase the proliferation of hybrid ownership may also constitute a hindrance to the 




4.4.2 Empirical Framework 
We are interested in two potential outcomes: 
𝑌1𝑖 =  𝜇1(𝑋𝑖) +  𝑈1𝑖  
𝑌0𝑖 =  𝜇0(𝑋𝑖) +  𝑈0𝑖 (4.1) 
in which 𝑌𝑗𝑖   is the total annual vehicle miles traveled by household 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛  in 
vehicle state 𝑗 = 0, 1 for which 𝑗 = 1 denotes hybrid ownership (treatment), 𝑋𝑖  is a 𝑘-
dimensioned vector of observable household-specific factors that influence gasoline 
consumption, 𝜇𝑗(𝑋𝑖): ℝ
𝑘 → ℝ is the conditional mean of 𝑌𝑗𝑖 given 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑈𝑗𝑖 is an error 
term that captures unobservable factors that influence miles traveled. We focus on miles 
traveled as the outcome, because given fuel efficiency ratings it is straightforward to 
calculate whether hybrid households consume less gasoline compared to non-hybrid 
households. This model describes two possible states from which the household chooses 
– hybrid or non-hybrid – and allows the household to select into a state based on 𝑋𝑖. 
Given (4.1), define 𝛥𝑖 =  𝑌1𝑖 −  𝑌0𝑖  to be the effect on miles traveled from driving a 





parameters can be defined; typically, researchers are interested in mean effects. Our 
interest here is on the mean effect of treatment on treated households:  
𝐸[∆𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1] −  𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1] (4.2) 
where 𝐻𝑖 is a binary indicator for whether or not the household owns a hybrid. That is, 
we are interested in the average effect of driving a hybrid vehicle on miles traveled for 
households that own a hybrid. We choose this parameter for the following reason. It is 
known that identification of the average effect of treatment on any randomly selected 
household; 𝐸[∆𝑖|𝑋𝑖]  requires a full support condition of the propensity score (e.g., 
Heckman et al. 1998). In our data, this condition fails; we discuss this condition in more 
detail below, and provide a clear explanation. Rather, our data supports identification of 
the average effect of treatment on the treated population. Given substantial differences in 
the populations of hybrid owning (1285 households) and non-hybrid owning households 
(35,495 households), it is more practical to focus on the average effect of treatment on 
the treated population. 
We can directly estimate 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1]  using observational data, but not the 
counterfactual 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1] . Under the assumption that 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1] ≈
𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1], then a control group of non-hybrid owning households can be used to 
estimate the counterfactual. The selection bias is given by 
𝐵(𝑋𝑖) =  𝐸[𝑌1𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1] −  𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1] (4.3) 
and 𝐵(𝑋𝑖) = 0 in the event that conditional on 𝑋𝑖 there are no differences between the 
hybrid and non-hybrid households except for hybrid ownership status. Under the 
structure in (4.1), 
𝐵(𝑋𝑖) =  𝐸[𝑈1𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1] −  𝐸[𝑈0𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1]. (4.4) 
In other words, the bias will be non-zero if we fail to control all potential unobservables 












4.4.3 Identification and Estimation 
 
 
4.4.3.1 Identification   
There are a variety of tools available to deal with observables; Equation (4.4) 
indicates that our primary concern is in regards to the unobservable factors that may 
correlate with both hybrid adoption and annual miles traveled. Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2001a, 2005), Heckman et al. (2006), and related papers describe instrumental variables 
strategies for identifying and estimating different treatment parameters based on versions 
of the design in (4.1). Too often in practice, and is the case here, instrumental variables 
are difficult to obtain. 
As we describe in Section 4.5, our data includes numerous (observable) control 
variables that cover a wide range of factors that correlate with both hybrid adoption and 
vehicle miles traveled. Despite the richness of data, we remain concerned that there are 
two unobservable factors that likely influence both hybrid adoption and vehicle miles 
traveled. The first is household preferences for fuel efficiency and environmental quality, 
and the second is local social norms. As we describe in Section 4.2, both factors are 
correlated with both adoption and miles traveled. If we exclude them in the control 
variables, it is unlikely that the conditional means of these unobservables are either equal 
across hybrid and non-hybrid states, or both zero, and the bias in (4.4) will not be zero. 
In reality, it is very difficult to directly observe households’ preferences for fuel 
efficiency, environmental quality, and the local social norms they face. However, some 
indicators, combined with the covariate matching method, can be used to capture them 
indirectly. We precede our analysis by making the following assumptions: 
(i) Unobservable household preferences for fuel efficiency and environmental quality 
is monotonically related to the average miles per gallon of vehicles owned by the 
household. 
The assumption implies that household preferences for fuel efficiency and 
environmental quality can be captured by the MPG ratings of other vehicles owned by the 





is defined by one certain vehicle in the household (the criteria used to choose the vehicle 
is described in that section). We use the average fuel efficiency rating on other vehicles 
owned by the household in order to ensure that this measure does not depend on the fuel 
efficiency rating of the vehicle that defines the treatment status of the household. That is, 
this measure of other MPG ratings is related to the treatment status of the household only 
through the household’s preference for environmental quality. Since only the MPG of 
other vehicles can be used to measure the household’s preference level for fuel efficiency 
and environmental quality, our analysis is restricted to households that own multiple 
vehicles.   
We contend that this assumption is plausible and not overly restrictive. This 
assumption requires that for any two households with different degrees of fuel efficiency 
or environmental preference, the household with a greater preference will have a higher 
average fuel efficiency rating across vehicles in the household. This allows us to use 
nearest neighbor matching to control for unobservable preferences for fuel efficiency or 
environmental quality that influence both hybrid adoption and vehicle miles traveled. In 
addition, this assumption rules out cases such as a two-vehicle household that owns a 
Toyota Prius and a Hummer and is characterized by both strong positive and negative 
environmental preferences. 
(ii) Local social norms are constant within a metropolitan area. 
This assumption is based on the findings from previous research that households that 
live in the same area have similar social norms (Kahn 2007, Sexton and Sexton 2014). 
Through matching households who live in the same metropolitan area to each other, we 
are able to eliminate the effect of local social norms. We realize that this assumption rules 
out complex network effects, such as differences in social incentives related to the 
environment at the place of work, and daily recreation. While these complexities may, in 
some cases, exist, they are impossible to observe; hence, this assumption places certain 
restriction on these interactions to make identification tractable, while not completely 
ruling out social incentives. In our analysis, we consider models that replace (ii) with the 





(iia) Local social norms are constant within a zip code area. 
Under (iia), we can allow for variation in social norms across zip codes, but require 
that social incentives are not heterogeneous within. The zip code area is smaller than the 
CBSA area, and so matching on zip code relaxes the assumption of homogeneity within 
the CBSA area though still requiring homogeneity of social norms within the same zip 




4.4.3.2 A Matching Estimation Strategy   
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that a single household cannot be 
observed in both hybrid (treated) and non-hybrid (untreated) states at the same point in 
time (Holland 1986). To address this issue, untreated (control) households can be used to 
proxy for the counterfactual, and a variety of methods are available to facilitate this 
comparison. As discussed in Imbens and Rubin (2015), common parametric regression 
methods depend critically on the functional form restrictions for extrapolation of the 
counterfactual. A flexible, and more robust alternative is to use the method of matching.  
Given our interest on 𝜏𝑎𝑡𝑡 =  𝐸[∆𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 = 1], the method of matching imputes the 





𝑗=1   for the 
𝑀 closest matches, in terms of observable characteristics, to household 𝑖. We use nearest-
neighbor matching, using the Mahalanobis distance metric 𝐴 = (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋𝑗)
′
𝑆−1(𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋𝑗) 
for 𝑆 being the sample covariance between 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑗, to control for observable factors. In 
practice, 𝑀 is selected by the econometrician and we use 𝑀 = 1; Imbens (2004) indicates 
that one-to-one matching (i.e., setting 𝑀 = 1 so that each treated unit is matched to a 
single control unit) is the approach with the least bias.  
It is well-known, at least anecdotally, that hybrid owners are more likely to have 
higher income and higher education. Additionally, we might expect that hybrid 
households are not particularly large (in terms of household members) given that hybrid 
vehicles are relatively smaller passenger cars. We might also suspect that households that 





of reducing the cost of the commute. Each of these covariates are observable, and 
including them in our set of matching covariates allows us to eliminate any bias 
otherwise induced in 𝜏𝑎𝑡𝑡 by differences in these covariates across hybrid and non-hybrid 
households. 
An advantage of the matching estimator, coupled with assumptions (i) and either (ii) 
or (iia), is that we can eliminate bias induced by unobservable household green 
preferences and local social norms by including certain variables into our set of matching 
covariates. It is possible to explicitly impose an exact match in terms of a specific 
attribute; asymptotically, discrete and key covariates are exactly matched, though in 
practice a large sample of control units is required to reliably impose an exact match 
along a certain dimension (the greater the exact match requirements, the more data that is 
needed). Given the large size of our set of non-hybrid (control) households, we can 
reliably restrict our matched households in several key dimensions, and eliminate 
potential bias from these unobservable factors.  
The first dimension on which we require an exact match is the year in which the 
hybrid was purchased. As discussed in our review of the literature, the hybrid market 
penetration rate is an important factor impacting hybrid adoption and underlying the 
proliferation of hybrid vehicles throughout the 2000s decade. Gasoline price and 
government policy incentives, which vary temporally, are also important factors affecting 
hybrid adoption. By requiring the hybrid households to match to non-hybrid households 
that purchased a vehicle in the same year, we can eliminate the effect of the market 
penetration rate, the effects of temporal changes of gasoline prices and policy incentives 
on hybrid adoption, as well as other unobservable year factors. 
The second dimension on which we restrict our match is the geographical area of 
residence, defined as either the CBSA or zip code. Restricting the matched households to 
reside within the same geographic area eliminates any differences in social values that 
might otherwise confound our estimates of 𝜏𝑎𝑡𝑡 . For instance, certain areas (e.g., San 
Francisco) are typically regarded as espousing a higher degree of social concern for the 
environment. By requiring hybrid owners in San Francisco to be matched to non-hybrid 





common throughout, San Francisco. Exact matching on geographical area also eliminates 
the effects of spatial variation of gasoline prices and policy incentives. Combined with 
the exact matching on purchase year, matched households are guaranteed to face the 
same gasoline price and same policy incentives when they make the vehicle purchase 
decision. 
In our analysis, we consider restrictions at the CBSA level, as well as the zip code 
level. The former is able to eliminate effects from factors associated with the residential 
location of the household, and also provides a greater number of matching options in the 
same matching area which increases the quality of the match for other variables. The 
latter especially strengthens the location matching, which eliminates the effects of 
geographical dissimilarities because zip codes are plausibly more homogeneous than 
CBSAs.12 
The third dimension over which we require an exact match is the vehicle type or 
counterpart of each hybrid. Requiring an exact match on vehicle type ensures that our 
hybrid households are matched to non-hybrid households that purchased a similar sized 
vehicle (i.e., a vehicle in the same class). To strengthen this matching dimension, we also 
exactly match hybrid households to those households who did not purchase a hybrid, but 
purchased a counterpart model of a hybrid. For example, matching a household that 
purchased a Honda Civic hybrid to a household that purchased a non-hybrid Honda Civic. 
Following the literature, we match the Toyota Prius, which does not have a counterpart 
non-hybrid model, with the Toyota Corolla (Sexton and Sexton 2014). Through exact 
matching on hybrid counterparts, we ensure that matched households are highly similar 
to each other in vehicle tastes and preferences, with the only difference being whether the 
vehicle is a hybrid or not. 
Other dimensions over which we conduct exact matching include frequency of 
internet use and household education. We match on frequency of internet use to capture 
unobservable preferences for new technology. It is important to bear in mind that the 
NHTS survey was conducted in 2008-2009, and records hybrid purchases over the 2000s 
                                                          
12 Not all households belong to a CBSA. We consider models in which we classify all households that are 
not in a CBSA to a common group and match them on state level green plan capacity index, and another 





decade. During this time period, daily internet use was not generally commonplace across 
all socio-economic groups. Low frequency of internet use indicates that the household is 
not open to new technology. Finally, our initial attempt was to include education in our 
nearest neighbor match, but we find via post-match balancing statistics that we obtain a 
better post-match balance when imposing the exact match on education as well. 
In addition to requiring an exact match along these dimensions, we use nearest 
neighbor matching on a number of household characteristics that could affect driving 
distance or hybrid adoption of the households, including income, household size, number 
of vehicles, average age of drivers in the household, share of female drivers in the 
household, commute distance, local green preference capacity index, and average MPG 




4.4.3.3 Identification and Estimation of the Social Status Rebound Effect   
To estimate whether there is a social status rebound effect, we restrict the sample to 
only hybrid vehicles, and to define all non-Prius hybrids to be the control group. 
Treatment, in this setup, is Prius ownership. We continue to deploy the nearest neighbor 
and exact matching strategy as described before to deal with both observable and 
unobservable factors, except that we conduct nearest neighbor matching on education 
instead of exact matching since exact matching over education no longer improves 
matching quality. Then, the significance of our matching estimate ?̂?𝑎𝑡𝑡  indicates the 




4.4.3.4 Failure of the Support Condition Necessary for Identifying the ATE   
To further motivate our choice to focus on the 𝐴𝑇𝑇, we discuss the potential for 
identification of causal effects when hybrid ownership is considered as treatment. This 
discussion is useful for understanding which types of policy assessments can be made in 
this context. An important result that is described in detail in Heckman et al. (1997) and 





requires full support of the estimated propensity score of treatment.13 The average effect 
of treatment on the treated, on the other hand, only requires the propensity score take 
values over some interval (0, 𝑝′) for some 𝑝′ < 1. In essence, identification of the 𝐴𝑇𝑇 
does not require as much from the data; in practice, it is more likely that the 𝐴𝑇𝑇 is 
identified even in cases in which the 𝐴𝑇𝐸 is not. See also Carneiro et al. (2010, 2011).  
This point is important because it provides critical insight into the types of causal 
effects that can be identified with respect to hybrid vehicles and hybrid drivers. Our own 
probit estimates of the propensity score in Table 4.1 show the range of support being 
(0.000, 0.458) and (0.000, 0.953). Across many probit models we estimated – that both 
include and exclude the federal incentive variable as a potential instrumental variable (see 
the following subsection) – we do not obtain estimates of the propensity score for the 
hybrid model that have a maximum support that exceeds about 0.55. Given the 
theoretical econometric conditions, these estimates indicate that identification of an 𝐴𝑇𝐸  
parameter is not feasible (at least given our NHTS sample). In all models we estimate, we 
do find estimates of the propensity score arbitrarily close to zero, which indicates that the 
𝐴𝑇𝑇  may be identified. 
These results, while somewhat disappointing, are both intuitive and informative. If 
one imagines a stereotypical hybrid household to be relatively high income and high 
education (this stereotype is also apparent in our NHTS sample), it is certainly possible to 
find plenty of non-hybrid drivers who match the same demographic characteristics. To 
use the cliché green/brown terminology, there are plenty of brown consumers who match 
the demographics of green consumers. This means that comparison of individuals on the 
basis of observable demographics, for instance through probit regression of the 
propensity score, does not have sufficient power to satisfy the full support condition. 
Hence, from these insights, we choose to focus on the 𝐴𝑇𝑇; this parameter is more likely 
to be identified by observational data, and also allows for informed policy assessment via 
a means of understanding whether existing hybrid owners drive differently from the 
counterfactual. 
                                                          
13 Of course, depending on the chosen estimator, other conditions must be satisfied. To make the current 





4.4.3.5 Why Not an IV Approach?   
A related point is the viability of an instrumental variables approach to identification 
via the tools developed by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005). Obviously, any 
factor that influences hybrid adoption that is correlated with individual, household, or 
community environmental preferences is not a valid instrumental variable, as the same 
variable will be correlated with annual miles traveled. Additionally, given that our 
measurements are at the household level, the more aggregated the measurement of the 
potential instrumental variable, the more likely the variable is to be a weak instrument 
(see also Diamond 2009). Given these restrictions, discovery of an instrumental variable 
is difficult. 
Our first instinct was to use the federal tax deductions and credits as an instrumental 
variable, as these variables have been shown to be correlated with hybrid adoption at an 
aggregated level and are plausibly exogenous to household vehicle choice. Though these 
variables are valid, preliminary regressions strongly indicate that these variables are weak 
and unreliable. The weakness of these instruments comes from the fact that they are 
aggregated in availability across consumers, and essentially become collinear with 
gasoline prices, hybrid vehicle penetration rates in the automobile market, and a time 
trend.14 It is possible to estimate probit regressions in which the federal incentive measure 
is positive and significantly correlated with hybrid adoption; see Table 4.1. However, (i) 
the statistical significance is not stable across samples and model specifications; (ii) is not 
robust to nonlinear specifications; and (iii) has an average marginal effect of less than 5 
percent on the probability of hybrid adoption. Furthermore, direct deployment of the 
federal incentive as an instrumental variable in an IV-regression of annual miles traveled 
on hybrid ownership (and controls) generates infeasible coefficient estimates and 
standard errors, and does not pass standard tests of weak instruments.15  
 
                                                          
14 State and local incentives also exist, but these variables are less credibly valid as state and local policy 
incentives are likely correlated with general trends of environmental preferences within the state or local 
communities. Still, we experimented with these variables, which turned out to be even less reliable than the 
federal incentive measures. Complete details regarding these variables and regression results can be 
furnished upon request from the authors. 
15 For instance, the IV point estimate implies that hybrid households drive about 50,000 miles less per year 





Moreover, economists understand that hybrid ownership is driven to a substantial 
degree by unobservable individual/household specific preferences, as well as 
community/social influence. Many households might be classified as never-takers of 
hybrid treatment; it is likely that there are no instrumental variables that can yield 
exogenous incentives for these consumers to purchase a hybrid. To be more concrete, in 
certain communities, hybrid vehicles might bear a negative social stigma, under which 
many consumers are not willing to purchase a hybrid (for instance, under a government 
rebate policy). These consumers certainly exist, and it is important to recognize that it is 
unlikely that their hybrid treatment effect can be identified through typical observational 
data. Similarly, certain green consumers are always-takers; it is equally difficult to find 
any type of exogenous incentive that encourages these consumers to purchase a hybrid, 
since they are naturally pre-disposed to hybrid ownership. Research (e.g., Sallee 2011) 
has shown that the government incentives do significantly correlate with the household 
decision to buy a hybrid; it is not clear, however, whether green households simply time 
their purchases to coincide with a maximum incentive value, or whether the incentive 
independently induces hybrid purchase in a group of compliers. It is likely that the 
incentive both stimulates compliers to purchase a hybrid – likely consumers with light-
green preferences – as well as being taken simply by green consumers who would have 
purchased the hybrid regardless (Ozaki and Sevastyanova 2011). It is difficult to know 
how big is the complier group, and hence whether an instrumental variables approach is a 
promising empirical strategy. 
Instead, our approach is to use a flexible, nonparametric matching approach to 
eliminate bias from both observable and unobservable factors that influence both hybrid 
adoption and driving behavior. Given knowledge of the unobservable factors that likely 
have the largest influence on both the hybrid choice and driving habits (see assumptions 










4.5 Data Construction and Summary Statistics 
 
 
4.5.1 Data Construction 
The majority of our data comes from the 2009 National Highway Travel Survey 
(NHTS), conducted nationally by the U.S. Department of Transportation from March 
2008 through May 2009. The original data contains 150,147 households, 309,163 
vehicles, and 351,275 individual persons. Since our analysis is at the household level, the 




4.5.1.1 The Definition of Treatment 
Since we conduct our analysis at the household level, treatment is defined as whether 
or not the household owns a gasoline-electric hybrid. That is, any household that has 
purchased at least one brand new hybrid vehicle is considered treated, and any household 
that has purchased a brand new non-hybrid vehicle is part of the control group. Hence, 
our analysis is restricted only to households that have purchased at least one new vehicle 
during the 2000s decade.  
We define hybrid status in the following way. For hybrid households, if the 
households bought only one hybrid, the purchased hybrid is chosen. If a household 
purchased more than one hybrid, then the hybrid first purchased is chosen because the 
first hybrid purchase defines the first instant in which the household was hybrid treated. 
For households that do not own a hybrid, we choose the vehicle that was purchased most 
recently. The most recent purchase is chosen for three reasons. First, the most recent 
purchase is the most recent instance in which the household had an opportunity to decide 
whether to receive treatment or not. Second, given that the NHTS survey was conducted 
during 2008 and 2009, the most recent purchase corresponds to the purchase time when a 
household's characteristics are the most similar to its characteristics at the survey time. 
Third, for matching hybrid households to non-hybrid households who are similar, it is not 
necessary to match based on all purchases. With a large control group, we have the 





4.5.1.2 NHTS Data Sample 
Overview  Since our focus is on measuring the difference in miles traveled between 
households who own a hybrid vehicle and households that do not, we include variables 
measuring hybrid ownership and miles traveled of households, household characteristics, 
characteristics of all vehicles owned by households, and characteristics of regions in 
which the households live. All households with incomplete information on these 
variables are dropped. Since hybrid vehicles are only available in the sample after 2000, 
to avoid any potential estimation bias from the systematic differences that might exist 
between households that purchased a hybrid and households that purchased a new car 
prior to 2000, we limit our study to households who bought at least one new vehicle after 
2000. To determine whether a purchased vehicle is brand new or used, we follow the 
same criterion used by NHTS: when the difference between the purchase year and the 
model year of a vehicle is less than two years, the vehicle is assumed to have been 
purchased brand new; otherwise, the vehicle is assumed to have been purchased used.  
The NHTS data provides information on whether a specific vehicle is a hybrid 
vehicle or not; however, in the NHTS survey, gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles are not 
coded differently from vehicles using some kind of alternative fuel. Since we only focus 
on electric-gasoline hybrid vehicles, to eliminate vehicles that use alternative fuel but are 
not gasoline-electric hybrids, we compare NHTS information on the make/model/year of 
each vehicle with a list of all possible make/model/year combinations of gasoline-electric 
hybrid vehicles. The sources for comparison include the Vehicle Make and Model book 
associated with the NHTS documentation, Edmunds.com, Hybridcars.com, Wikipedia, 
and previous economic research. Any alternative fuel vehicles that are not found to be 
gasoline-electrics are dropped. 
In addition, we are only interested in vehicles that are used for personal travel and 
consume gasoline. We include any vehicles classified as automobile/car/station wagon, 
van (minivan, cargo van, or passenger van), sport utility vehicle, and pickup truck, and 
drop motorcycle, other trucks, golf carts, and other vehicles. The NHTS survey also 






remove all households who own any such vehicle. We also remove all households who 
own vehicles using diesel, natural gas or electricity, other than motor gasoline. 
Several further removals of observations are conducted due to the specific 
requirements of certain variables. We provide the detailed definitions of some variables 
included in this study below; the information of the further data removals based on 
certain variables are also provided in the description of the variable.  
Annual Miles Traveled  The measure of annual miles traveled by each household 
comes from the variable BESTMILE in the NHTS survey. Due to the imprecision of 
perception and memory of respondents, it is difficult to collect precise and reliable 
information on miles traveled for a whole household in the past whole year. To obtain a 
reliable measurement of annual miles traveled, NHTS estimates the annual miles traveled 
for each household via (i) information on each vehicle owned by a household, including 
self-reported miles traveled, the odometer reading, model year, purchase year, and 
vehicle type; (ii) information on the primary driver of each vehicle, including the 
education, age, gender, and working status of the primary driver; (iii) information on the 
characteristics of each household, including number of persons, number of vehicles, 
household life cycle classification, and the MSA region in which the household lives; and 
(iv) miles traveled in the assigned travel day of each household. The most critical sources 
of information are self-reported annual miles traveled, the odometer reading of each 
vehicle, and information on the primary driver. When all three sources are available, all 
are used jointly to construct the estimate of annual miles traveled (72.4 percent of the 
vehicles in the NHTS survey fall into this category). When some information is missing, 
only the existing information is used. After estimation, the annual miles estimate is 
validated via comparison to the odometer reading and self-reported annual miles traveled. 
If the difference surpasses certain criteria, the annual miles estimate is identified as an 
outlier. We drop all households for which the BESTMILE estimate is classified as an 
outlier. 
Household Income  Household income is a categorical variable, and measures the 
total income of each household. This variable has 18 different categories, representing 





than $5,000, and Category 2 indicates annual household income between $5,000 and 
$9,999. The highest category, Category 18, indicates annual household income greater 
than $100,000.  
Highest Education  The NHTS survey records the education level of each person as 
a categorical variable, taking 5 distinct values. These values from 1 to 5 represent less 
than high school; high school or GED; some college, vocational, or an Associate's degree; 
a Bachelor's degree; and graduate or professional degree. We use the highest level of 
education in the household as our measure of household education. 
Life Cycle  The NHTS survey includes a life cycle variable, that indicates whether 
the household has one or two heads, children, and whether or not the head(s) are retired.16 
We believe these life-cycle indicators are important correlates of both the hybrid adoption 
decision and miles traveled. 
Internet Usage  We include in our analysis an indicator for whether at least one 
member in the household uses the Internet almost every day. This variable is used to 
measure both the attitude of the household to new technology, general socioeconomic 
status, and degree of connectedness. The adoption of a hybrid is affected by the attitude 
of households towards new technology. If a household is open to new technology, we 
expect members in that household to use the internet frequently. Since this variable is 
measured at the person level in the survey, we use the frequency of the person with the 
most frequent Internet use among all household members, in order to capture the 
maximum preference to new technology for each household.  
Commute Distance to Work  Commute distance to work measures the sum of 
commute distance across all workers in each household. Work commute constitutes 
mandatory travel, and affects both hybrid adoption and miles driven. We dropped any 
households with a single family member reporting a commute distance of more than 75 
miles.  
 
                                                          
16 Specifically, the categories with values 1 to 10 are one adult, no children; 2+ adults, no children; one 
adult, youngest child 0-5; 2+ adults, youngest child 0-5; one adult, youngest child 6-15; 2+ adults, youngest 
child 6-15; one adult, youngest child 16-21; 2+ adults, youngest child 16-21; one adult, retired, no children; 





MPG of Other Vehicles  To measure the general degree of environmentalism and 
preference for fuel saving at the household level, we include the average MPG rating of 
other vehicles. As we have described, it is difficult to measure households’ preference for 
fuel efficiency and the environment; yet, households with stronger environmental 
preferences and those that care more about fuel costs are more likely to purchase 
relatively fuel efficient vehicles for all vehicles in the household (see also Table 4.1). 
Hence, incorporating this variable into our matching analysis allows us to match hybrid 
households to non-hybrid households that have similar preferences on both fuel 
efficiency and the environment. 
Household Geographic Location  The geographic location of households is also 
correlated with both the hybrid adoption decision and driving habits. For example, 
households living in a more environmental friendly area would be more likely to buy a 
hybrid; households living a large metropolitan area may have an advantage of better 
public transportation and drive less. Additionally, certain states or cities (e.g., California 
or Seattle; Sexton and Sexton 2014) are known to have a reputation of being more 
environmentally friendly, which correlates with both hybrid adoption and driving habits. 
As we have described, matching geographically allows us to control for general spatial 
influences that may correlate with both hybrid adoption and driving habits. 
To control for these correlates, we include several variables to control for these 
effects. The NHTS survey has several variables that we consider: MSA category, MSA 
population, and Rail. MSA category measures the metropolitan statistical area of each 
household, MSA population size measures the size of the MSA in which the household 
lives, and Rail is a binary variable that measures whether or not the MSA area has rail 
transportation services available.17 In addition, we consider a more simple Urban/Rural 
indicator variable to differentiate households in urban from rural areas. 
 
                                                          
17 Specifically, MSA category takes values 1 if the MSA in which the household lives has a population of 1 
million or more, and has a rail system; 2 if the MSA has a population of 1 million or more, but does not 
have a rail system; 3 if the MSA has a population of less than 1 million; 4 if the household is mot in an 
MSA. The MSA population variable takes a value of 1 if the household lives in an MSA with fewer than 
250,000; 2 for an MSA with a population between 250,000-499,999; 3 for an MSA with 500,000-999,999; 






Basic Household Demographics  We also include the number of vehicles in each 
household, household size, the number of drivers, the average age of drivers, and the 
number of workers, in order to control for the impact of these household demographics 
on both hybrid adoption and annual miles traveled. We record the Hispanic status of the 
household as a binary indicator that equals one if the household self-reports as being 
Hispanic, and zero otherwise. The race of each household is categorical. 18  We also 
include the average age of all drivers and the share of female drivers in each household.  
Gasoline Price  We obtained data on the price of regular grade gasoline from 2000 
to 2009 from the Council for Community and Economy Research. The data measures the 
quarterly gasoline price at the CBSA level, which provides variation across and within 
years and CBSA regions. We match households via geographic location to gasoline 
prices. We first match at the city level; any household that cannot be matched to a 
gasoline price at the city level is matched at the CBSA level; any remaining household is 
matched into a state average for the gasoline price. For different parts of our analysis, we 
are interested in both the gasoline price at the time in which the hybrid was purchased, as 
well as the gasoline price at the time the NHTS survey was taken and annual miles 
traveled was computed. 
Green Plan Capacity Index  We also use the Green Plan Capacity (GPC) index 
from Resource Renewal Institute (Siy et al. 2001) to measure the strength of 
environmentalism across different regions in which households live as an important 
control for unobservable factors that may correlated with hybrid vehicle adoption. The 
GPC index is defined on a 100-point scale, covering 65-indicators, and is calculated for 
each state in the U.S. It is comprised of four sub-indices: comprehensiveness of the 
environmental management framework; level of environmental policy innovation; fiscal 
and program commitment; and the quality of governance. The index is time invariant, 
varying only over states. 
Policy Incentives  Incentives from the federal government and state government are 
also important factors influencing households' hybrid adoptions (Sallee 2011). We obtain 
                                                          
18 The categories with values from 1 to 8 indicate whether the household members are white, African 
American, Asian, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific, Multiracial, 





detailed data on these policy incentives from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the 
Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC) of the United States Department of Energy, 
official state statute documentation, and previous economic research (Diamond 2009, 
Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011, Sallee 2011).  
Before 2006, the federal government provided a $2,000 federal tax deduction for all 
hybrid purchases. The exact benefit for each household depends on the real income tax 
rate for the household, which we cannot observe. We assume the same tax rate, 25 
percent, for all households. 19  Since January 1, 2006, the tax deduction policy was 
replaced by a tax credit policy. The specific amount of credit that a certain hybrid model 
receives is based on its fuel efficiency level compared to equivalent gasoline vehicles. 
The amount of full credit across models varies between $450 and $3,150, and phased out 
gradually after the manufacturer of the model sold a total of 60,000 hybrids. Federal tax 
credit incentives for all hybrids from Toyota phased out in 2007, and federal tax credit 
incentives for hybrid models from Honda phased out at the end of 2008. To obtain a 
uniform measure of the tax credit across households, we use the weighted mean of tax 
credits of all hybrids in our dataset at each point in time. The weights of different hybrid 
models are decided by their proportion across all hybrids models in our dataset, which is 
used as a proxy of the market share for each hybrid.  
State hybrid incentives include income tax credits, sales tax exemptions, tax rebates, 
and HOV lane access. Detailed information on federal and state incentives, including the 




4.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample, as well as the hybrid and 
Prius samples individually. Our final dataset includes 36,780 households. Of these, 
35,495 households do not own a hybrid vehicle, while 1,285 households own a hybrid 
vehicle. Of these hybrid owning households, 696 own a Prius. The distribution of all 
makes and models of the hybrid vehicles in the sample are provided in Appendix E,  
                                                          
19 25 percent is very close to the mean of real incentives benefit Beresteanu and Li (2011) calculated using 





Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic 
















26,636 14,495 27,914 14,461 27,259 13,391 
Household Income 13.92 4.50 15.86 3.47 15.81 3.50 
Highest Education 3.77 1.06 4.34 0.86 4.43 0.81 
No. of Vehicles 2.35 0.64 2.35 0.65 2.37 0.65 
Household Size 2.69 1.12 2.62 0.98 2.57 0.96 
No. of Adults 2.10 0.50 2.08 0.47 2.08 0.48 
No. of Drivers 2.12 0.54 2.12 0.53 2.14 0.55 
No. of Workers 1.21 0.88 1.30 0.87 1.29 0.90 
Hispanic 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.21 
Race 1.29 1.11 1.30 1.14 1.25 1.01 
Average Age of 
Drivers 
53.31 14.06 53.31 12.85 54.47 13.06 
Share of Female 
Drivers 
0.51 0.23 0.50 0.21 0.50 0.20 
Life Cycle 5.98 3.34 5.77 3.32 5.90 3.37 
Internet Usage 0.83 0.38 0.94 0.24 0.95 0.22 
Commute Distance 14.61 17.73 16.48 18.98 16.20 18.72 
Penetration Rate 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Gas Price (Purchase) 2.32 0.66 2.61 0.58 2.58 0.59 
Gas Price (Survey) 3.51 0.17 3.58 0.20 3.60 0.21 
Year Purchased 2,005.49 1.97 2,006.32 1.48 2,006.16 1.54 
Vehicle Type 2.05 1.14 1.36 0.77 1.02 0.21 
MPG of Other 
Vehicles 
21.21 4.55 23.20 7.34 24.27 8.56 
MSA Category 2.49 0.98 2.20 0.98 2.20 1.01 
Rail in MSA 0.17 0.38 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46 
Urban 0.70 0.46 0.76 0.43 0.75 0.43 
GPC Index 37.71 7.33 38.69 6.99 38.88 7.35 
Federal Incentive 881.71 773.85 996.28 805.48 954.74 786.95 
State Incentive 96.60 475.38 74.51 488.25 92.99 572.00 










Table E.1. In that table, we see that the Toyota Prius is the most popular hybrid model, 
contributing to over 50 percent of the hybrids in our dataset, while the next most popular 
hybrids are the Honda Civic, Toyota Camry, Toyota Highlander, and Ford Escape. 
From Table 4.3, we see that the average household drives about 26,636 miles per 
year; hybrid households drive more miles per year (27,914). Prius households average 
more miles than the full sample, but fewer miles than the hybrid sample (27,259). Further, 
in the full sample of households, about 3 percent own a hybrid vehicle.  Not surprisingly, 
hybrid households average a higher income and education, are more frequent Internet 
users, average longer commutes, purchased the hybrid in a year/location with higher 
gasoline prices, and under higher Federal incentives. Further, we see that hybrid 
households average higher MPG ratings on other vehicles in the household, which 
provides some indication that hybrid households have uniformly stronger preferences for 
environmental preservation. We do not find much significant difference between hybrid 
and non-hybrid households in terms of the other household demographics. In general, 




4.6 Covariate Matching Results 
 
 
4.6.1 Metrics to Assess Balance and Overlap 
Prior to implementing our matching and differencing estimation strategy, it is 
informative to assess overall balance and overlap in the NHTS sample for hybrid and 
non-hybrid households, and Prius hybrid households and non-Prius hybrid households. 
The procedures here follow Imbens and Rubin (2015). 
The Normalized Difference   The first metric we consider for assessing balance is 














in which μ denotes the mean, 𝜎2 denotes the variance, and the subscripts 𝑡 and 𝑐 indicate 
the treated and control samples, respectively. This normalized differences provides a 
measure of dispersion of the means of the two samples that is unit free. Further, in 
contrast to the standard t-test for equality of means, the normalized difference is invariant 
to changes in the sample size. Further, as stated by Imbens and Rubin (2015), the purpose 
of balance tests is not to directly test the null hypothesis that the two subsamples have the 
same central tendencies, but rather assess the feasibility of using adjustment methods 
(e.g., matching or regression) to eliminate biases associated with observable covariates 
that arise in treatment effect estimation. To estimate ∆𝑐𝑡, one can use sample averages 
and sample variances. 
The normalized difference is in standard deviations. The larger the normalized 
difference for each covariate, the more difficult it will be to deploy adjustment techniques 
to adjust for biases. To provide some perspective, normalized difference measures of 
approximately 0.1 are in line with “what one might expect in a completely randomized 
experiment” (Imbens and Rubin 2015, p. 352). 
The Log Ratio of Standard Deviations  While the normalized difference measures 
differences in the central tendencies of the covariate distributions across treated/control 
samples, the log ratio of standard deviations measures the difference in dispersions of the 
two distributions. This measure is given by 
𝛤𝑐𝑡 = log(𝜎𝑡) −  log(𝜎𝑐) (4.6) 
where 𝜎  denotes the standard deviation and the rest of notations is as before. This 
measure can also be calculated from sample standard deviations, and the larger the value 
of 𝛤𝑐𝑡 for any particular covariate the larger the difference in distributional dispersion. 
For large values of 𝛤𝑐𝑡, the more difficult it will be to adjust for biases. 
The Fraction of Observations in the Tails of the Opposing Distribution  One of 
the important requirements for different bias adjustment methods (e.g., matching) is 
sufficient overlap in the distributions of covariates. One way to assess overlap is to 
determine the fraction of observations in the treated group that lie in the tails of the 






tails of the opposing treatment groups distribution, the more difficult it will be to find a 
corresponding observation in the opposing group to match to the treated units. 
Formally, we calculate this percentage via 
𝜋𝑡
𝛼 = [1 −  𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑐
−1(1 −  𝛼 2⁄ ))] +  𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑐
−1(𝛼 2⁄ )) (4.7) 




0.05 = [1 −  𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑐





4.6.2 Pre-Match Assessment of Balance and Overlap 
We report the results for our pre-match balance and overlap assessments in Table 
G.1. For all covariates, we use the full sample of 36,780 observations, of which 1,285 are 
hybrids and 35,495 are non-hybrids.  
It is clear from the table that there are substantial differences between hybrid and 
non-hybrid households along several important dimensions. We see that the normalized 
difference for household income, education, Internet usage, hybrid market penetration 
rate, gasoline price, year purchased, the MPG of other household vehicles, vehicle type, 
and MSA characteristics are all substantially higher than 0.10. These measures suggest 
that estimates that do not adjust for these differences are likely to be biased. 
The other metrics included in the table indicate that it will likely be feasible to 
restore balance via matching. The log difference in standard deviations and percent of 
observations in the tails of the opposing treatment group are all relatively low, which 
indicates substantial overlap in the distributions of these covariates between hybrid and 
non-hybrid samples. This is, in part, because of the large number of non-hybrid (control) 
households afforded to us by the NHTS survey. Through such a large set of non-hybrid 
households, we are able to carefully identify a close match for each hybrid household. 
We report pre-match balance and overlap statistics for the Prius treatment model 
(hybrid only sample) in Table G.2. For that sample there is fewer significant differences 
between Prius and non-Prius hybrid samples, pre-match. The largest differences are in 





exception of vehicle type, the other metrics indicate there is likely sufficient overlap to 





4.6.3 The Effect of Hybrid Ownership on Annual Miles Traveled 
Our matching estimates of the effect of hybrid ownership on annual miles traveled 
are reported in Table 4.4. In the top two panels, we require an exact match at the CBSA 
level as given by assumption (ii); the top panel further requires an exact match on vehicle 
type, and the middle panel further restricts the match to the exact vehicle counterpart. The 
bottom panel invokes assumption (iia) and restricts the match to the zip code level. The 
rest of the matching is as described previously. Finally, Model 1 includes households that 
are not located in a CBSA, requiring an exact CBSA match to another household also not 
in a CBSA but located within states with the closest GPC index, while Model 2 
eliminates these households.  
Each model specification has its own matching advantages. Matching on zip code 
and/or excluding households not in a CBSA are able to strengthen matching on 
geographical area; matching on the counterparts of each hybrid is able to improve the 
similarity on all factors influencing households’ choice related to brand, style, etc.; 
matching on CBSA and/or including households not in a CBSA increase the matching 
options and matching quality of other variables. The combination of all models covers 









Table 4.4:  Matching Estimates of the Effect of Hybrid Ownership on Annual Miles 
Traveled 
  Model 1 Model 2 
CBSA Level (Vehicle Type) 
  
Estimate 786.978* 772.432* 
Standard Error 436.140 436.267 
   No. of Matched Hybrids 1072 1036 
   
CBSA Level (Counterpart) 
  
Estimate 749.873** 398.077 
Standard Error 339.485 340.082 
   No. of Matched Hybrids 451 434 
   




Standard Error 249.826 
 
   
No. of Matched Hybrids  299   
The reported estimates and standard errors are Abadie and Imbens (2011) bias-corrected variants. An exact 
match is required for household education, year of purchase, frequency of Internet usage, vehicle type or 
counterpart, and CBSA or zip code. Matching on other covariates uses nearest neighbor matching using the 
Mahalanobis distance metric, allowing for one matched control unit for each treated unit. CBSA Model 1 
includes observations that are not in a CBSA, and Model 2 excludes observations that are not located in a 
CBSA. 
 
We find that, in most of the models we estimate, hybrid owning households drive 
more miles per year than households that do not own a hybrid. Our estimates range from 
just under 400 miles per year to just over 785. To provide more precise interpretation, the 
top panel estimate for Model 2 implies that a household that owns a hybrid, on average, 
drives 772 miles more per year than a non-hybrid owning household that purchased a 
new vehicle in the same year, resides in the exact same CBSA (and hence faces the same 
gasoline prices and social incentives), and has the same household demographics (e.g., 
income, education, commute distance, etc.).  The only insignificant rebound effect comes 
from the model matching on CBSA, non-hybrid counterparts, and excluding households 
not in CBSA. Generally, our results are similar across different model specifications, 









4.6.4 Is There A Social Status Rebound Effect? 
We report our matching estimates of the 𝐴𝑇𝑇  for the Prius social status driven 
rebound effect in Table 4.5 for the two CBSA models that match on vehicle type. Due to 
relatively small sample size of only hybrid households, we are not able to conduct 
matching at the zip code level. We find that in both models, the treatment effect estimates 
are not significant, which indicates that Prius and non-Prius hybrid households do not 
drive a significantly different number of miles per year. Hence, despite the anecdotal 
evidence that the social status signaling ability of the Toyota Prius might create an 
incentive for Prius drivers to increase driving miles to capitalize on the status signal, we 
do not find statistical evidence of this behavioral response. Further, we do not find a 




4.6.5 Post-Match Balance and Overlap Assessment 
Though our matching estimates are intuitive, the credibility of those estimates as 
causal effects depends critically on whether the matching procedure was able to restore 
balance to the covariate distributions. We report post-match balancing statistics for the 
estimates from Table 4.4 in Tables D.1, D.2, and D.3, and in Table D.4 for the estimates 
from Table 4.5. The normalized difference between the treated and control units is nearly 
zero (below 0.10) for most of the covariates across each of the specifications, indicating 
little chance that these covariates induce bias into our estimates.  
The most difficult covariate to get into balance is the average MPG of other vehicles. 
It is clear from these post-match balancing tables that the normalized difference for this 
covariate is greatly reduced via the matching procedure, and in each case is always below 
0.20 (recall that 0.10 is the benchmark for being as good as random). Hence, while there 
remains a slight distance in terms of this covariate, the match is still very good and it is 
not likely that this covariate leads to any significant bias in our estimates of the treatment 
parameter. From these measures, we conclude that there is virtually no cause for concern 






Table 4.5:  Matching Estimates of the Effect of the Prius Premium on Annual Miles 
Traveled 
  Model 1 Model 2 
CBSA Level 
  
Estimate −669.727 −334.350 
Standard Error 581.303 582.087 
   
No. of Matched Hybrids 330 322 
The reported estimates and standard errors are Abadie and Imbens (2011) bias-corrected variants. An exact 
match is required for year of purchase, vehicle type, frequency of Internet use, and CBSA. Matching on 
other covariates uses nearest neighbor matching using the Mahalanobis distance metric, allowing for 1 
matched control unit for each treated unit. Model 1 includes observations that are not in a CBSA, and 




4.7 Policy Implications: Hybrid Ownership and Gasoline Consumption 
The causal estimates of the impact of hybrid ownership on annual miles traveled has 
direct implications for policies that seek to reduce gasoline consumption via hybrid 
vehicle adoption. In this section, we provide some rough calculations as to the average 
fuel savings accrued on account of hybrid adoption, taking into account the (small) 
rebound effect we have estimated.  
From Table 4.4, the largest hybrid vehicle rebound effect is about 787 miles per year. 
Given that the average hybrid household in the sample drives 27,914 (Table 4.3), this 
rebound effect amounts to about 3 percent of annual miles traveled. Table 4.6 shows the 
average fuel efficiency increase for hybrid vehicles over either non-hybrid vehicles in the 
same class or to exact non-hybrid counterpart vehicles. In the first case, the average 
increase in fuel efficiency is 118.5 percent, and in the second case, is 93.4 percent. That 
is, the average fuel efficiency for hybrids is about double the average fuel efficiency for 
non-hybrids (either by type or counterpart).  
The average annual fuel consumption of a household is calculated by dividing the 
total annual miles traveled by MPG (fuel consumption = total annual miles 
traveled/MPG). It is then straightforward to compute a rough estimate of the change in 
fuel consumption from adoption of a hybrid vehicle.  
In the first case, comparing hybrids with all other non-hybrids, we estimate that the 





increase from original miles traveled, and the corresponding increase of fuel efficiency is 
118.5 percent. With the estimates, we calculate the associated fuel savings. Specifically,  
 




𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑀𝑇 × 103 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑃𝐺 × 218.5 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡
= 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 47.0 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 (4.9) 
 
which means that the average household that adopts a hybrid decreases its fuel 
consumption approximately 53.0 percent. 
In the second case, we only compare hybrids with their counterpart non-hybrid 
vehicles. The highest rebound effect of hybrid adoption is about 750 miles, averagely 2.7 
percent increase from original miles traveled; the corresponding increase of fuel 
efficiency is 93.4 percent. The associated fuel savings can be calculated to be 46.9 
percent with the same way in Equation (4.9). While this calculation is approximate, the 
potential fuel savings are substantial. One immediate implication of these calculations is 
that policies that encourage hybrid vehicle adoption are able to significantly reduce the 
consumption of gasoline. 
 
Table 4.6: The Increase in Fuel Efficiency from Hybrid Adoption 
  All Other Non-hybrids Non-hybrid Counterparts 
Non-hybrid 21.6 24.4 
Hybrid 47.2 47.2 
Increase in Fuel Efficiency 118.5% 93.4% 
Each number reports the average MPG for the vehicles in each category. All other non-hybrid vehicles 
include all non-hybrid vehicles in our sample; the Toyota Corolla is used as the counterpart for the Toyota 
Prius. 
 
As discussed earlier, our method is different from the method used in previous 
studies. First, we separate the response of driving distance to an improvement of fuel 
efficiency from the response coming from a change in the fuel price. Second, we use a 
matching method to compare the travel distance of households driving vehicles with 
different fuel efficiency directly instead of calculating the elasticity of driving distance 
with respect to fuel economy. To compare our results with findings from previous studies, 





of a hybrid increases 118.5 percent compared all other vehicles and 93.4 compared to the 
hybrid counterparts. It means that the hybrid fuel costs decrease 54.2 and 48.3 percent, 
respectively (if we use the same assumption in the previous literature that fuel costs have 
the equal and opposite effect on travel distance as fuel economy). Correspondingly, with 
a 100 percent decrease in fuel cost, the travel distance in our cases increase by 5 and 6 
percent, respectively. Consistent with the definition of a rebound effect in the literature, 
the rebound effects in our case are 5 and 6 percent.  
Small and Van Dender (2007) find that the rebound effect of driving distance with 
regard to fuel cost per mile is 2.2 percent in the short term and 10.7 percent in the long 
term. Hymel et al. (2010) find that the rebound effect is 4.7 percent in the short term and 
24.1 percent in the long term. They both measure the response of vehicle travel to the fuel 
cost per mile, not fuel economy. Greene (2012) measures the response of vehicle travel to 
fuel economy and does not find a significant rebound effect. Gillingham et al. (2013) find 
evidence that rebound effects for energy efficient technology do not generally exist, and 
that any rebound effect that may exist is not enough to offset the environmental gains 
stemming from the improved efficiency. Our results are generally in line with findings 
from previous studies, and particularly consistent with the findings of Greene (2012) and 
Gillingham et al. (2013). With different model specifications, the estimated rebound 





We explore households’ adoption of gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles and the impact 
of hybrid ownership on annual miles traveled in order to understand how hybrid 
ownership impacts fuel consumption. Specifically, we examine two rebound effects: (1) 
whether households drive more due to the higher fuel-efficiency of hybrids; and (2) if 
there is a social status driven rebound effect associated with the social signaling value of 
a hybrid. Our research has important implications for environmental policy related to 
vehicle miles traveled and gasoline consumption: post assessment of policies encouraging 





vehicle miles traveled by fully-electric vehicles; and the effects of tightening the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards which foster proliferation of 
gasoline-electric hybrids to raise fleet fuel economy. Our analysis critically focuses on 
issues of identification in light of several behavioral factors that are known to influence 
both hybrid adoption and miles traveled.  
We construct multiple model specifications with different advantages to estimate 
rebound effects of hybrid adoption. With most model specifications, we find a 
statistically significant rebound effect due to the higher fuel-efficiency of hybrids: a 
household that owns a hybrid vehicle drives more miles per year, on average, than an 
identical household that does not own a hybrid. However, this rebound effect is only 
about 3 percent of the total annual miles traveled, and is insufficient to offset the fuel 
savings due to the higher fuel efficiency of the gasoline-electric hybrid engine. 
Additionally, we do not find any evidence of a statistically significant social status 
rebound effect associated with ownership of the Toyota Prius. Generally, we conclude 
that the rebound effect associated with hybrid adoption is small and hybrid adoption is 
able to save almost half of current gasoline consumption. 
Our ability to interpret these estimates as causal effects rests on whether or not there 
remain any significant post-estimation differences between hybrid and non-hybrid 
households. All post-matching balance assessments indicate that there are no remaining 
differences between the hybrid and non-hybrid samples; hence, our interpretation is 
causal. 
Our results provide an important insight into the effect of government policies that 
incentivize the adoption of alternative fuel-efficient vehicles and jump-start the 
alternative fuel car market. In particular, policies that encourage hybrid adoption do lead 
to fuel savings, despite the non-randomness of households who adopt them and the 
rebound effect of increased fuel efficiency on vehicle miles traveled. In addition, while 
certain hybrids are a mechanism to signal social status, we do not find evidence that this 
same mechanism leads to an alternative form of rebound. Our results also provide a 
valuable analogue for the effects of policies incentivizing the adoption of fully-electric 





While the methodology applied in this study appropriately captures the differences 
between annual miles traveled across households, we have to ignore any intra-household 
substitution of driving between different vehicles, since miles traveled for each vehicle 
are aggregated to the household level from the vehicle level. It is likely that hybrid 
vehicles would be driven more than non-hybrid vehicles inside a hybrid household since 
the former is more fuel efficient than the latter. However, the possibility of intra-
household substitution does not undermine our findings. The substitution of driving from 
non-hybrid vehicles to hybrid vehicles would only increase the average fuel efficiency of 
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5.1 Summary of Key Findings 
The interface between water and agriculture bears important scientific implications. 
First, water is an important input for agriculture. Irrigation in agriculture is a crucial 
factor to increase agricultural productivity, and access to water has a substantial impact 
on local agricultural economic development. Second, agriculture has a substantial impact 
on water. Irrigation in agriculture constitutes the largest withdrawal of water, which could 
aggravate water depletion when over-exploitation of water is already severe; agricultural 
production, especially fertilizer use, is one of the main sources of water pollution in many 
countries. Studying the specific mechanisms behind the interface of water and agriculture, 
and identifying the ones that maximize the positive benefit that agriculture can obtain 
from water and minimize the negative impacts of agriculture on water quantity and 
quality, are important for achieving agricultural development and sustaining a healthy 
environment. 
My first essay measures irrigation efficiency and explores the most effective policies 
to reduce groundwater depletion in Mexico. I find that the mechanisms of electricity cost-
sharing implemented in many wells have a sizable impact on inefficiency of irrigation 
application and groundwater depletion. Hence, I conclude that the elimination of cost 
share mechanisms seems like a more promising policy instrument for groundwater 
conservation in Mexico. Moreover, irrigation is inelastic to its own per unit cost, and 
electricity price-based policies may not be able to generate substantial effect in reducing 
irrigation application. Results also show that well-sharing does not significantly affect 
groundwater pumping, suggesting either a limited effect of individual pumping on water 





My second essay compares input- and output-based policies and identifies the most 
cost-effective policies to reduce fertilizer use and water pollution from agriculture. 
Results show that both input- and output-based policies lead to a significant reduction in 
fertilizer application, but input-based policies are more cost-effective than output-based 
policies. In terms of the speed at which they take effect, the two types of policies are 
similar to each other; in particular, both types of policies take effect rapidly – i.e., from 
one year to the next. Hence, adjustment in land allocation is not time costly, implying that 
policies that operate through this channel are not time costly either.  
In my third essay, I find that, on average, a hybrid household drives more miles per 
year than the average non-hybrid household. However, this rebound effect is only about 3 
percent of the total annual miles traveled, and is not large enough to offset the fuel 
savings from the higher fuel efficiency of the gasoline-electric hybrid engine. Hence, 
driving a hybrid leads to substantial fuel savings. I do not find evidence that the miles 
traveled of Toyota Prius households is significantly different from non-Prius hybrid 
households, which indicates that there is not a statistically identifiable social-status driven 




5.2 Main Contributions 
My first essay has four main contributions. First, I theoretically model the existence 
of cost-sharing externalities, and identify the conditions under which the externality 
causes higher groundwater extraction. Second, I empirically examine the existence of the 
cost-sharing externality and quantify its impact on the over-extraction of groundwater. 
My findings bear important policy implications because cost-sharing is a common issue 
not only in developing countries but also in developed countries. The (substantial) effect 
of the cost-sharing externality on the inefficiency of water use indicates the importance 
for policy to tackle this issue. Third, I compare three policy options faced by the Mexican 
government and identify the most effective one, which is the elimination of electricity 





problem, another common issue of groundwater pumping in developing countries, and 
quantify its impact on over-extraction of groundwater. 
My second essay has three main contributions. First, I propose a new dimension of 
policy assessment, time cost, in assessing economic policies that are directed toward 
decreasing fertilizer use and water pollution in agriculture. This dimension is important 
for both policymakers and society, but it has received relatively little attention in previous 
research. Second, I compare the cost-effectiveness of input and output-based policies to 
reduce fertilizer use in agricultural production. My findings indicate that while both of 
them are effective for reducing fertilizer use, input-based policies are more cost-effective. 
My third essay has three main contributions. First, I examine the existence of a new 
rebound effect, a social status driven rebound effect, which is associated with the 
distinctive outlook and social signal value of the Toyota Prius. Second, I empirically 
measure the rebound effect induced by the higher fuel efficiency of hybrid, focusing 
extensively on causal identification and management of omitted variables bias. My 
method relaxes the assumption used in previous research that consumers’ respond to the 
increase of fuel efficiency and the decrease of gasoline price in the exactly same way. 
Third, I develop appropriate measurements of subtle characteristics of households, such 
as a preference on lower travel cost, preference on environmental protection, and social 
pressure. These characteristics are unobservable and have been obstacles in studying 





5.3 Directions for Future Research 
My first essay finds that two cost-sharing rules lead to different levels of over-
pumping of groundwater, which is interesting and meaningful for policy design. However, 
the mechanisms behind the differences on the impacts of the two cost-sharing rules, and 
their potential social welfare implications for different types of farmers are still unknown. 
If policymakers are informed of these differences, policies could be designed more 





Future research that builds a theoretical model that can provide insight into the 
mechanism and potential welfare impacts on farmers would be valuable. 
My second essay quantifies the cost-effectiveness of policies to adjust agricultural 
practices, which is essential for policy assessment, but it is only the first step in 
developing policy that ultimately seeks an improvement in water quality. Beyond 
measuring cost-effectiveness, another essential portion is measuring the impact of these 
agricultural adjustments on water pollution. The magnitude of this impact is the key 
information desired by policymakers. The impact may take a long time to fully appear 
since nutrient runoff from agricultural production may stay in the water system for 
several years. That is, the dynamic changes of the impact of the adjustments in 
agricultural practices on water pollution are important as well. My future research will 
quantify these dynamic impacts to provide full information for policy design and policy 
assessment.  
My third essay measures the rebound effects of hybrid adoption on miles traveled 
and finds a significant rebound effect induced by higher fuel efficiency of the hybrid 
vehicle. According to the literature, the rebound effect may be different in the long-term 
and in the short-term. Future work measuring dynamic changes in the rebound effects 




































Appendix A: Conditions under which electricity cost-sharing distorts marginal cost 
of pumping 
We are interested in identifying conditions under which electricity cost-sharing may 




. Both marginal cost expressions depend 
upon variables assumed exogenous to the farmer in this study. In particular, the price of 
electricity (𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ), the conjectural variation parameter (𝜌), the share of the electricity bill 
paid by farmer 𝑖 (𝑠𝑖), and the total amount of water pumped by other farmers in the well 
(∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 ) are exogenous to the individual farmer. 
The conjectural variation parameter captures a farmer’s beliefs about other farmers’ 
reaction to his pumping. These beliefs typically emerge from previous experience and are 
pre-determined (exogenous) relative to the farmer’s pumping decision. We consider a 
range of values of 𝜌 to illustrate the robustness of the distortive effect of cost-sharing on 
marginal cost. Similarly, cost-sharing rules are established before the beginning of the 
growing season. Moreover the number of farmers sharing a well and the size of farms 
were also determined previous to farmers’ pumping decisions. 20  Therefore 𝑠𝑖  is also 
exogenously determined in our analysis. 
Letting 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ denote the subsidy per kWh, the difference in marginal cost between 





= [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ][𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊 + (1 + 𝜌)(𝑏𝑤𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖(𝑎 + 2𝑏𝑊))] > 0. 
 
(A.1) 
With no over-subsidy on electricity cost (𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ > 0) and assuming symmetry 
(𝑤𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖𝑊) we can re-write the above condition as: 
𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊 + (1 + 𝜌)(𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑊 − 𝑠𝑖𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑊) > 0 (A.2) 
which after some algebraic manipulation can be re-written as: 
                                                          
20 Among the groups that indicated a year of formation in the original survey, less than 10 percent were 





(𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊) − (1 + 𝜌)𝑠𝑖(𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊) > 0.          (A.3) 
Since 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊 > 0 as defined before, Equation (A.3) implies that 
𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 > 0  
if and only if 
(1 + 𝜌)𝑠𝑖 < 1. 
In general the higher 𝜌, the less likely it is that implementing a cost share rule will 
reduce marginal cost of pumping. This is to be expected intuitively. When a farmer 
anticipates that others will significantly increase their pumping in response to an increase 
in her own pumping, the benefits of cost-sharing vanish. 
Table A.1 describes the conditions for increased extraction under cost share. 
Conditions are depicted for three conjectural variation scenarios: (1) 𝜌 = 1 , where 
pumping rates are strategic complements, also known as Loschian conjecture after the 
model of Loschian competition, (2) 𝜌 = 0  where pumping rates are strategically 
independent, also known as Cournot-Nash conjecture after the model of Cournot 
competition, and (3) 𝜌 = −1, where pumping rates are strategic substitutes, also known 










> 0  
𝜌 = −1 [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ](𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊) > 0 , which is always true. 
𝜌 = 0 
[𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ](𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊)(1 − 𝑠𝑖) > 0 , which holds whenever 𝑠𝑖 < 1. 
Regardless of the cost share rule, the condition 𝑠𝑖 < 1 holds for all wells shared by 
more than one producer. 
𝜌 = 1 
[𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣𝑘𝑤ℎ](𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊)(1 − 2𝑠𝑖) > 0 , which holds whenever 𝑠𝑖 < 0.5. 
When costs are evenly split, 𝑠𝑖 < 0.5 holds whenever N>2. When costs are divided 
based on land area, 𝑠𝑖 < 0.5 holds for all irrigators that operate less than half of the 





Appendix B: Data collection process 
 
The data collection process required two steps. First the enumerators collected the 
data on the irrigation unit, (e.g., number of farmers sharing the well, crops grown by 
producers) from an individual familiar with the management of the well. In some cases 
the respondent is a single individual with well management responsibility while in other 
cases it is any one of the users or a group of users. The enumerators then asked the 
respondent(s) to identify a representative individual who produced each of the main crops 
for the unit. Those identified individuals were interviewed for the crop-specific survey, 
which was completed for each of the primary crops grown by producers who share the 
well. Thus, there is one crop-specific survey for each crop-well combination. The crop-
specific survey includes questions about inputs, outputs, and prices for each crop. 
Cross sectional data was obtained from farmers in a sample of 256 wells. A total of 
197 observations contained complete information for our estimation purposes so this is 
the size of our sample. Irrigation wells are uniformly scattered across the country so they 
are geographically representative of agricultural groundwater irrigators in Mexico. 
Regarding the well selection mechanism, a sample was initially drawn based on a 
national survey of irrigation wells, and the enumerators tried to find those wells from the 
sample. However, in many cases the irrigation wells that were chosen did not exist. In 








Table C. 1:  Coefficient Estimates for Input Demands (water, fertilizer and other 
inputs) 
  Estimates            
Water equation 
 
Constant -39896.6 (33315.0) 
Output quantity 547.6** (247.6) 
Interaction of land area and output quantity -97.5*** (35.4) 
Land area 3208.5*** (394.9) 
Quadratic term of output quantity 2.1** (0.9) 
Interaction of quadratic land area and output quantity 1.0** (0.5) 
Dividing electricity bill by share of land area 16456.9** (8114.8) 
Dividing electricity bill evenly 25801.5*** (8515.8) 
Number of farmers sharing a well 279.0 (316.5) 
Soil type 6566.6 (5629.1) 
Climate type 12315.7 (14850.1) 
Depth of well 42.8 (54.8) 
Age -227.6 (419.2) 
Education 4078.8 (4436.3) 
Share of fruit and vegetable 3834.3 (11379.4) 




Constant 2059.1 (8825.2) 
Output quantity -167.5** (66.2) 
Interaction of land area and output quantity 8.3* (4.9) 
Land area 417.3*** (96.9) 
Quadratic term of output quantity 0.2 (0.2) 
Interaction of quadratic land area and output quantity -0.04 (0.07) 
Dividing electricity bill by share of land area -73.9 (1862.8) 
Dividing electricity bill evenly -154.4 (2643.8) 
Number of farmers sharing a well 62.7 (96.0) 
Soil type 358.1 (855.8) 
Climate type -7899.0 (5075.5) 
Depth of well 2.0 (7.1) 
Age 62.9 (71.9) 
Education -530.0 (1352.6) 





Table C.1. Continued 
  Estimates            
 
Other inputs equation 
 
 
Constant -15245.0 (13229.9)  
Output quantity 66.5 (60.3)  
Interaction of land area and output quantity 7.1 (4.5)  
Land area 1517.7*** (116.2)  
Quadratic term of output quantity -0.9*** (0.3)  
Interaction of quadratic land area and output quantity -0.2*** (0.1)  
Dividing electricity bill by share of land area -796.3 (2009.3)  
Dividing electricity bill evenly -6010.8** (2759.0)  
Number of farmers sharing a well -62.7 (74.6)  
Soil type -581.0 (2091.5)  
Climate type 7362.3 (6421.6)  
Depth of well 35.4* (21.1)  
Age 170.3 (165.9)  
Education 307.1 (1778.8)  
Share of fruit and vegetable 2305.2 (4497.1)  
   
𝑅2 (Water equation) 0.741  
𝑅2 (Fertilizer equation) 0.592  
𝑅2 (Other inputs equation) 0.862  
Observations 197  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**) and three asterisk (***) denote 
















Table D. 1:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Parameter Estimates 
 
Coefficient Standard Error 
A11 2722.86*** 784.21 
A12 -2095.62*** 531.96 
A13 -314.06 560.50 
A22 1446.34*** 418.06 
A23 132.51 424.32 
A33 4210.31*** 974.66 
B11 136.19 481.69 
B12 -994.10* 515.60 
B22 4930.27*** 1283.33 
C11 -2281.58*** 351.14 
C12 9.65 517.65 
C21 1600.72*** 278.40 
C22 -1087.95*** 372.86 
C31 535.11 477.22 
C32 -1120.01** 467.65 
O11 18.90*** 4.86 
O21 -3.54 2.56 
O31 4.86* 2.62 
P11 -0.76*** 0.09 
P12 -1.28*** 0.40 
P21 -0.15** 0.06 
P22 0.66*** 0.22 
P31 -0.01 0.06 
P32 0.20 0.22 
R11 2810.18*** 356.24 
R21 -1080.62*** 275.05 
R31 10.62 280.00 
S11 -15.00*** 1.64 
S21 7.06 7.16 
V11 -1326.01*** 193.97 
V21 846.18*** 307.03 
M11 -1.21*** 0.06 
M12 0.07 0.11 
M21 0.02 0.01 
M22 0.09*** 0.03 
The regression includes fixed effects. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The 
letter name for the parameters corresponds to the matrix names given in Equation (3.5), and the subscript 
notation refers to the element position (row, column) in that matrix. The order of netputs is corn, fertilizer, 





Appendix E: Additional Descriptive Statistics 
Table E. 1: Summary of Makes and Models for Hybrid Vehicles 
Make Model Number Percent 
Cadillac Escalade 1 0.1 
Chevrolet Tahoe 19 1.5 
Chevrolet Silverado 2 0.2 
Chrysler Aspen 3 0.2 
Ford Escape 59 4.6 
GMC Yukon 10 0.8 
Honda Civic 176 13.7 
Honda Accord 41 3.2 
Lexus LS 600hl 3 0.2 
Lexus GS 450h 9 0.7 
Lexus RX 400h 25 1.9 
Mazda Tribute 1 0.1 
Mercury Mariner 13 1 
Nissan Altima 16 1.2 
Saturn Vue Green Line 8 0.6 
Toyota Camry 133 10.4 
Toyota Prius 680 52.9 
Toyota Highlander 86 6.7 
Total   1285 100 
The data in this table come from two sources: IRS http://www.irs.gov/uac/AlternativeMotor-Vehicle-
Credit-1 and http://www.cars.com/go/advice/Story.jsp?section=buy and subject=tax and story=taxCredit. 
Further, when there is difference in the credit amount across different model years for a certain hybrid 
model, we use the credit amount of the most recent model year before 2009. Also, when there is difference 






Appendix F: Federal and State Hybrid Adoption Incentives 
 
Table F. 1:  Summary of Ongoing Federal Tax Credits for Hybrid Vehicles (after 
1/1/2006) 
Make Model Credit Amount 
Cadillac Escalade $2,000  
   
Chevrolet Malibu $1,300  
Chevrolet Tahoe $2,200  
Chevrolet Silverado $450  
   
Chrysler Aspen $2,200  
   
Dodge Durango $2,200  
   
Ford Escape $2,475  
   
GMC Yukon $2,200  
GMC Sierra $450  
   
Mazda Tribute $2,475  
   
Mercury Mariner $2,475  
   
Nissan Altima $2,350  
   
Saturn Aura $1,300  














Table F. 2: Summary of Phased out Federal Tax Credits for Hybrid Vehicles (after 
1/1/2006) 
Model Purchase Date Credit Amount 
Toyota Prius 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006 $3,150  
 
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007 $1,575  
 
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007 $787.50 
 
10/1/2007 - $0  
Toyota Camry 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006 $2,600  
 
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007 $1,300  
 
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007 $650  
 
10/1/2007 - $0  
Toyota Highlander 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006 $2,600  
 
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007 $1,300  
 
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007 $650  
 
10/1/2007 - $0  
Lexus GS 450h 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006 $1,550  
 
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007 $775  
 
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007 $387.50  
 
10/1/2007 - $0  
Lexus RX 400h 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006 $2,200  
 
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007 $1,100  
 
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007 $550  
 
10/1/2007 - $0  
Lexus LS 600h 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006 $1,800  
 
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007 $900  
 
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007 $450  
 
10/1/2007 - $0  
Honda Civic 1/1/2006 - 1/1/2008 $2,100  
 
1/1/2008 - 6/30/2008 $1,050  
 
7/1/2008 - 12/31/2008 $525  
 
1/1/2009 - $0  
Honda Accord 1/1/2006 - 1/1/2008 $1,300  
 
1/1/2008 - 6/30/2008 $650  
 
7/1/2008 - 12/31/2008 $325  
 
1/1/2009 - $0  
Honda Insight 1/1/2006 - 1/1/2008 $1,450  
 
1/1/2008 - 6/30/2008 $725  
 
7/1/2008 - 12/31/2008 $362.50  





Table F. 3:  Summary of State Level Incentives for Hybrid Vehicles 
State Amount Start Date End Date 
Income Tax Incentives 
   
Colorado $6542* 7/1/2000 12/31/2010 
Louisiana $500* 1/1/1991* 7/9/2009 
New York $2,000  1/1/2001* 12/31/2004 
Oregon $1,500  1/1/1998* 12/31/2009 
South Carolina $630* 6/1/2006 12/31/2009 
Utah $1720* 2001* 12/31/2005* 
West Virginia $3750* 7/1/1997 6/30/2006 
    Sales Tax Incentives 
   
Connecticut $1500* 10/1/2004 10/1/2008 
Washington D.C. $3294* 4/15/2005* Not yet expired 
Maine $625* 1/1/1997 12/31/2005 
Maryland $1,000  7/1/2000 7/1/2004 
Maryland $1,500  7/1/2004 5/20/2010 
New Mexico $750* 7/1/2004 6/30/2009 
New York $240* 1/1/2000 5/28/2005 
Washington $2,015  1/1/2009 7/31/2009 
Washington $73  8/1/2009 12/31/2010 
    HOV Lane Access 



















    Rebate Incentives 
   
Illinois $1,000  7/15/2007 10/1/2008 
Pennsylvania $500  11/29/2004 3/6/2010 
    Testing Exemptions 
   
Idaho 
 






5/31/2007 Not yet expired 
    Personal Property Tax Incentive 
   
Michigan $32  7/26/2002 12/31/2012 









Appendix G: Pre-Match Balancing and Overlap Assessments 



















Mean Std. Dev. 
Household Income 15.865 3.469 13.853 4.515 0.500 -0.264 0.011 0.094 
Education 4.337 0.863 3.746 1.065 0.609 -0.210 0.037 0.147 
No. of Vehicles 2.353 0.646 2.353 0.642 0.001 0.006 0.734 0.732 
Household Size 2.617 0.985 2.696 1.128 -0.074 -0.136 0.048 0.066 
No. Adults 2.075 0.467 2.100 0.505 -0.051 -0.079 0.065 0.076 
No. Drivers 2.125 0.534 2.116 0.544 0.015 -0.018 0.055 0.090 
Hispanic 0.051 0.219 0.052 0.222 -0.007 -0.014 0.949 0.948 
Race 1.304 1.140 1.291 1.106 0.011 0.031 0.928 0.923 
Average Age 53.315 12.852 53.310 14.098 0.000 -0.093 0.026 0.087 
Share of Female 0.500 0.209 0.511 0.229 -0.052 -0.088 0.083 0.087 
Life Cycle 5.773 3.318 5.991 3.340 -0.066 -0.007 0.339 0.301 
No. Workers 1.296 0.869 1.210 0.877 0.098 -0.010 0.219 0.248 
Internet Usage 0.941 0.236 0.825 0.380 0.366 -0.476 0.059 0.175 
Commute Distance 16.475 18.975 14.543 17.681 0.105 0.071 0.305 0.323 
Penetration Rate 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.577 0.262 0.114 0.125 
Gas Price (Purchase) 2.606 0.577 2.315 0.659 0.471 -0.133 0.042 0.140 
Gas Price (Survey) 3.582 0.204 3.505 0.169 0.413 0.188 0.047 0.043 
Year Purchased 2006.315 1.485 2005.463 1.984 0.486 -0.290 0.005 0.190 
MPG of Other Vehicles 23.201 7.342 21.142 4.402 0.340 0.512 0.096 0.043 
Vehicle Type 1.358 0.770 2.079 1.148 -0.737 -0.400 0.822 0.623 
MSA Category 2.202 0.982 2.505 0.980 -0.309 0.002 0.286 0.169 
Rail in MSA 0.286 0.452 0.169 0.375 0.280 0.186 0.714 0.831 
Urban 0.758 0.428 0.696 0.460 0.140 -0.071 0.242 0.304 









Table G. 2: Pre-match Balancing and Overlap Assessment – Prius Treatment 
  Prius Households Non-Prius Households Normalized 
Difference 






  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Household Income 15.809 3.496 15.930 3.438 -0.035 0.017 0.037 0.025 
Education 4.431 0.809 4.226 0.912 0.238 -0.120 0.024 0.211 
No. of Vehicles 2.368 0.655 2.336 0.635 0.049 0.030 0.724 0.745 
Household Size 2.575 0.957 2.667 1.016 -0.094 -0.060 0.045 0.053 
No. Adults 2.079 0.478 2.071 0.454 0.017 0.052 0.069 0.061 
No. Drivers 2.138 0.545 2.109 0.520 0.055 0.048 0.078 0.056 
Hispanic 0.045 0.206 0.058 0.233 -0.060 -0.123 0.955 0.942 
Race 1.249 1.006 1.368 1.278 -0.104 -0.239 0.922 0.944 
Average Age 54.474 13.063 51.945 12.469 0.198 0.047 0.086 0.041 
Share of Female 0.503 0.201 0.496 0.218 0.036 -0.080 0.073 0.095 
Life Cycle 5.898 3.372 5.625 3.250 0.082 0.037 0.341 0.338 
No. Workers 1.295 0.898 1.297 0.834 -0.003 0.074 0.237 0.197 
Internet Usage 0.951 0.216 0.929 0.258 0.095 -0.177 0.049 0.071 
Commute Distance 16.195 18.723 16.807 19.280 -0.032 -0.029 0.322 0.282 
Penetration Rate 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.022 0.016 0.046 0.041 
Gas Price (Purchase) 2.581 0.593 2.635 0.556 -0.094 0.064 0.059 0.049 
Gas Price (Survey) 3.598 0.206 3.564 0.202 0.168 0.019 0.053 0.053 
Year Purchased 2006.161 1.541 2006.497 1.396 -0.229 0.099 0.057 0.022 
MPG of Other Vehicles 24.273 8.558 21.933 5.309 0.329 0.477 0.089 0.051 
Vehicle Type 1.023 0.213 1.754 0.975 -1.035 -1.520 0.989 1.000 
MSA Category 2.195 1.010 2.209 0.949 -0.014 0.063 0.306 0.261 
Rail in MSA 0.306 0.461 0.261 0.440 0.099 0.047 0.694 0.739 
Urban 0.747 0.435 0.771 0.421 -0.055 0.033 0.253 0.229 





Appendix H: Post-Match Balance Assessments 
 
Table H. 1:  Post-match Balancing Assessment for CBSA and Vehicle Type 
Matching Model – Hybrid Treatment 
Covariate 











Household Income -0.028 0.063 -0.036 0.067 
Education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Vehicles 0.082 0.152 0.078 0.149 
Household Size 0.049 0.072 0.051 0.080 
No. of Drivers -0.031 0.147 -0.028 0.150 
Hispanic 0.013 0.026 0.009 0.017 
Race 0.061 0.170 0.057 0.165 
Average Age -0.052 0.028 -0.049 0.028 
Share of Female 0.029 0.266 0.030 0.262 
Life Cycle 0.003 -0.029 0.012 -0.026 
No. of Workers -0.080 0.024 -0.083 0.026 
Internet Usage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Commute Distance 0.080 0.206 0.074 0.191 
Penetration Rate -0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 
Gas Price (Purchase) -0.011 -0.018 -0.015 -0.019 
Gas Price (Survey) 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 
Year Purchased 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MPG of Other 
Vehicles 
0.176 0.301 0.167 0.302 
MSA Category -0.006 -0.000 -0.005 -0.003 
MSA Size 0.015 -0.012 0.011 -0.010 
Rail in MSA 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Urban 0.011 -0.007 0.021 -0.015 
GPC Index -0.003 -0.012 -0.018 -0.053 
CBSA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Vehicle Type 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Post-match normalized difference and log ratio of standard deviation statistics for the matched estimates 
reported in Table 4.4. An exact match is required for household education, frequency of Internet usage, 
year of hybrid purchase, vehicle type, and CBSA. One-to-one nearest neighbor matches using the 
Mahalanobis distance metric was required for household income, size, vehicle count, MPG of other 
vehicles, commute distance, age, share of female, and GPC index. See the notes to Table 4.4 and text for 





Table H. 2:  Post-match Balancing Assessment for CBSA and Counterpart Matching 
Model – Hybrid Treatment 
Covariate 











Household Income 0.189 -0.079 0.145 -0.030 
Education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Vehicles 0.067 0.119 0.052 0.109 
Household Size -0.023 -0.004 -0.035 -0.006 
No. of Drivers -0.152 0.009 -0.161 -0.005 
Hispanic -0.099 -0.159 -0.102 -0.158 
Race -0.050 -0.019 -0.040 0.008 
Average Age 0.010 0.006 0.017 -0.004 
Share Female -0.047 0.034 -0.048 0.051 
Life Cycle -0.138 -0.003 -0.129 0.003 
No. of Workers -0.042 -0.075 -0.055 -0.079 
Internet Usage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Commute Distance -0.084 -0.075 -0.097 -0.087 
Penetration Rate -0.010 -0.001 -0.009 -0.011 
Gas Price (Purchase) -0.012 -0.116 -0.016 -0.115 
Gas Price (Survey) 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
Year Purchased 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MPG of Other 
Vehicles 
0.067 0.200 0.051 0.211 
MSA Category -0.010 -0.022 0.000 -0.015 
MSA Size -0.039 0.022 -0.028 0.014 
Rail in MSA -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 
Urban -0.133 0.113 -0.126 0.119 
GPC Index -0.025 0.030 0.014 0.039 
CBSA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Counterparts 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Post-match normalized difference and log ratio of standard deviation statistics for the matched estimates 
reported in Table 4.4. An exact match is required for household education, frequency of Internet usage, 
year of hybrid purchase, counterparts of hybrid, and CBSA. One-to-one nearest neighbor matches using the 
Mahalanobis distance metric was required for household income, size, vehicle count, MPG of other 











Table H. 3: Post-match Balancing Assessment for Zip Code and Vehicle Type 
Matching Model – Hybrid Treatment 
Covariate 
Normalized  Log Diff. of       
Difference Std. Dev. 
Household Income -0.016 -0.037 
Education 0.000 0.000 
No. of Vehicles 0.040 0.157 
Household Size 0.032 0.035 
No. of Drivers -0.074 -0.005 
Hispanic -0.059 -0.119 
Race -0.010 0.084 
Average Age 0.081 -0.019 
Share Female -0.001 -0.035 
Life Cycle 0.181 -0.010 
No. of Workers -0.147 0.049 
Internet Usage 0.000 0.000 
Commute Distance -0.086 -0.011 
Penetration Rate -0.024 -0.010 
Gas Price (Purchase) -0.031 0.002 
Gas Price (Survey) 0.000 0.000 
Year Purchased 0.000 0.000 
MPG of Other Vehicles 0.198 0.129 
MSA Category 0.000 0.000 
MSA Size 0.000 0.000 
Rail in MSA 0.000 0.000 
Urban -0.115 0.084 
GPC Index 0.000 0.000 
Zip Code 0.000 0.000 
Vehicle Type 0.000 0.000 
Post-match normalized difference and log ratio of standard deviation statistics for the matched estimates 
reported in Table 4.4. An exact match is required for household education, frequency of Internet usage, 
year of hybrid purchase, vehicle type, and zip code. One-to-one nearest neighbor matches using the 
Mahalanobis distance metric was required for household income, size, vehicle count, MPG of other 
vehicles, commute distance, age, share of female, and GPC index. See the notes to Table 4.4 and text for 





Table H. 4:  Post-match Balancing and Overlap Assessment for CBSA Level 
Matching Model – Prius Treatment 
Covariate 
Model 1 Model 2 







Household Income -0.205 0.146 -0.246 0.207 
Education 0.041 0.101 0.004 0.135 
No. of Vehicles 0.132 0.119 0.136 0.124 
Household Size -0.180 -0.065 -0.180 -0.072 
No. of Drivers 0.013 0.189 0.007 0.174 
Hispanic 0.187 0.426 0.189 0.426 
Race -0.041 0.023 -0.041 0.023 
Average Age 0.184 0.171 0.173 0.163 
Share Female 0.001 0.225 0.010 0.211 
Life Cycle -0.005 0.065 -0.021 0.060 
No. of Workers -0.190 0.165 -0.169 0.153 
Internet Usage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Commute Distance -0.069 0.076 -0.068 0.068 
Penetration Rate 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.037 
Gas Price (Purchase) 0.084 0.052 0.068 0.032 
Gas Price (Survey) -0.019 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
Year Purchased 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MPG of Other 
Vehicles 
0.127 0.111 0.101 0.124 
MSA Category -0.004 0.005 0.008 0.017 
MSA Size -0.006 0.018 -0.003 0.023 
Rail in MSA 0.012 0.001 0.006 0.001 
Urban -0.095 0.080 -0.128 0.122 
GPC Index -0.022 0.107 -0.035 -0.096 
CBSA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Vehicle Type 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Post-match normalized difference and log ratio of standard deviation statistics for the matched estimates 
reported in Table 4.5. An exact match is required for year of hybrid purchase, vehicle type, frequency of 
internet use and CBSA. One-to-one nearest neighbor matches using the Mahalanobis distance metric was 
required for household income, size, vehicle count, MPG of other vehicles, highest education, commute 
distance, age, share of female, and GPC index. Model 1 allows for households outside of CBSA to be 
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